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ABSTRACT
The prim ary  pu rpose  of th is  stu dy  is to exam ine th e  viability of 
two basic  theories of com pensation  to explain executive com pensation  
in the  bank ing  industry . The two executive com pensation  m otivation 
theories are sa le s /sa le s  growth m axim ization and  p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er 
w ealth  m axim ization. Overall, strong  su p p o rt is found for bo th  
theories. This research  also seeks to significantly expand, com pared to 
previous research , the  n u m b er of b an k s investigated. This stu d y  
succeeds, w ith over a four-fold increase  in  the  n u m b er of b a n k s  
analyzed, including over 330 b a n k s  no t previously u sed  in the  
literature. This investigation is fu rth e r m otivated by th e  paucity  of 
banking  stud ies on com pensation  and  th a t recen t banking  
com pensation research  ignores th e  sa le s /sa le s  grow th m axim ization 
theory.
This s tudy  te s ts  th ree  different definitions of CEO com pensation. 
They are to ta l com pensation, a n n u a l cash  com pensation, and  options 
awarded. The period of tim e u n d e r investigation is 1998-2004. The 
prim ary source of b a n k  CEO com pensation  d a ta  is SNL Financial L.P., 
which b reaks down com pensation  into its  com ponent p a rts  of base  
salary, bonus, o ther cash  com pensation, n on -cash  com pensation, and
iii
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value of options granted. S tan d ard  an d  Poor’s R esearch Insigh t 
(C om pustat North America) provides the  source for the  various 
m arket-based  and  accoun ting-based  perform ance m easu res u sed  in  
th is  study. A one-way, fixed-effects, u n b a lan ced  panel m odel is u sed  to 
analyze the  data .
In sum m ary, w hen using  th e  entire d a ta  set, th is  s tu d y  strongly 
su ppo rts  the  viability of bo th  theories of CEO com pensation  for each  of 
the  three tested  definitions of CEO pay. Next, the  d a ta  se t is split in to  
larger banks, representative  of b a n k  sam ples of earlier research , an d  
sm aller banks, previously excluded from research . These two s u b ­
sam ples of b an k s  yielded very different pay-perform ance linkages 
w hen analyzing to tal pay and  option pay. In general, for the  larger 
banks, less suppo rt is found for the  profit or shareho lder w ealth  
m axim ization theory. In th is  research , scale of operations dom inates 
o ther linkages betw een pay an d  perform ance. Sm aller banks show  
stronger linkages to pay th a n  larger banks.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
B ackground a n d  Motivation 
An executive com pensation  package should  m otivate the  
m anager while aligning the  m anager’s actions w ith the  ow ner’s (Fama, 
1980). This need re su lts  from th e  condition th a t em ployee/m anagers 
serve as agen ts of atom istic ow ners, the  shareho lders, (Jensen  & 
Meckling, 1976). In the  bank ing  industry , regu la to rs m onitor 
m anagerial behavior su c h  th a t th e  need  for shareho lder m onitoring 
m ight be lessened. Confirming evidence com es from H ouston  and  
Ja m es  (1995) and  Collins, Blackwell, and  Sinkey (1995) who find th a t  
b a n k  executive com pensation  m ay be explained, a t least in  part, by a  
b an k 's  regu la to r-m andated  investm ent opportunity  set.
However, shareholders ' and  regu la to rs’ prim ary  goals m ay differ. 
The Federal Deposit In su rance  C orporation Im provem ent Act (FDICLA) 
of 1991 is an  example in  w hich regu la to rs m ay be p u rsu in g  one goal, 
safety, while owners prefer ano ther goal, high re tu rn s. In  su c h  cases, 
ow ners will need to design incentive packages to align m anagers ' 
in te rest w ith th a t of the  ow ners, instead  of the  regulators.
1
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2One technique th a t m ay achieve convergence of m anager an d  owner 
in te rests  is a  "profit-sharing" p lan  th rough  w hich executive 
com pensation is contingent upon  corporate financial perform ance 
(Harris & Raviv, 1979). For ow ners to successfully  align owner and  
m anager in te rests , linkages betw een observable perform ance variables 
and  m anager com pensation  m u st be determ ined. There are  two basic  
executive com pensation  m otivation theories, s a le s /s a le s  growth 
m axim ization and  p ro fit/sh areh o ld er w ealth  m axim ization, w hich can  
be used  to find these  linkages.
The pu rpose  of th is  study  is to exam ine th e  viability of these  two 
basic  theories of com pensation to explain executive com pensation  in  
the  banking  industry . Generally trea ted  as com peting theories, the  two 
theories of executive com pensation  m ay in  fact be com plem entaiy. The 
sa le s /sa le s  growth m axim ization theory  suggests th a t sa les revenue 
growth is th e  prim ary  m anagerial objective because  it leads to a  larger 
firm, resu lting  in  an  increase in  prestige an d  perk  consum ption  for 
m anagem ent (see Baum ol, 1959, 1962 and  1967). U nder sa le s /sa le s  
growth m axim ization, m anagers seek  job  security , perks, an d  prestige 
ahead  of m axim izing shareholders ' w ealth  and , as such , a positive 
relationship  exists betw een com pensation  and  sales.
The p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth  m axim ization theory  holds th a t 
competitive m arke t forces p lus the  s tru c tu re  of com pensation  
con tracts align m anagers ' and  shareho lders ' in te rests . T hus, firm s no t
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3using  com pensation  s tru c tu re s  encouraging p ro fit/sh areh o ld er w ealth  
m axim ization w ould be prone to be less efficient and  m ore suscep tib le  
to failure. Accordingly, there  shou ld  be a positive relationship  betw een 
executive com pensation  an d  b a n k  perfo rm ance /shareho lder w ealth.
S ta tem en t of Problem  
It is only during  th e  period from  the early  1960s th rough  the  
1980s th a t com pensation  research  explicitly te s ts  bo th  the  
p ro fit/sha reho lder w ealth  m axim ization an d  sa le s /sa le s  growth 
m axim ization theories. R esults for bo th  theories are  mixed, w ith 
perhaps slightly more su p p o rt for the  p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth 
m axim ization theory. The g rea test deficiencies in  stud ies during  th is  
period are th a t  the  definition of to ta l com pensation  includes only cash  
com ponents an d  only one stu d y  includes any  banks. Moving th rough  
the  1990s to the  p resen t, options, stock, and  o ther fringe benefits are  
also incorporated  into the  definition of to tal com pensation. However, 
during  th is  la ter period te s ts  of th e  sa les /s a le s  growth m axim ization 
theory are dropped. S tud ies on b a n k s  do no t appear un til th e  early to 
m iddle 1990s, by w hich tim e none explicitly include variables to te s t 
the  sa le s /sa le s  growth m axim ization theory. R esults of resea rch  using  
b a n k s  during  th is  period are m ixed for the  p ro fit/sh areh o ld er w ealth 
m axim ization theory. R esults often differ solely on w hat variable is 
included in  the  sta tistica l model, accoun ting-based  or m arket-based . 
N on-banking stud ies tend  to u se  m arke t-based  m easu res of changes
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4in  shareho lder w ealth w ith g rea ter frequency a s  the  decade passes. 
A ccounting-based variables are  u se d  less frequently  b u t  do no t 
d isappear altogether. A w eakness of m ost b an k  s tud ies  is th e  relatively 
sm all da ta  se ts  th a t are used .
Objectives
From th e  preceding p arag rap h s , the  first objective of th e  cu rren t 
study  is estab lished . The first objective of th is  s tu d y  is to utilize the  
two theories, p ro fit/sha reho lder w ealth  m axim ization and  sa le s /sa le s  
growth m axim ization, to explain to ta l CEO com pensation  in the  
banking  industry . This objective is relevant because: 1. there  is a  
paucity  of bank ing  stud ies on com pensation, 2. the  recen t banking  
stud ies only include one of the  com pensation  theories, 3. it is time to 
revisit the  sa le s /sa le s  growth m axim ization theory, w hich ju s t  
d isappears from the com pensation  lite ra tu re  in  the  early 1990s, 4. 
previous stu d ies  yield m ixed re su lts  over all periods of tim e for bo th  
non -banks an d  banks, an d  5. con tinued  deregulation of the  bank ing  
industry  is often said to m ake b a n k s  look m ore like non-banks.
Because each of the  two com pensation  theories m ay only explain 
a  portion of to ta l com pensation, th e  second objective of th e  cu rren t 
stu d y  is to analyze th e  two theories in relation to individual 
com ponents or su b se ts  of com ponents of com pensation. The m ajor 
com ponents of total com pensation  are  base  salary, bonus, o ther cash  
com pensation, non-cash  com pensation  and  value of options granted.
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5Previous research  defines to ta l com pensation  in  m any  different ways; 
however, fu rth er analysis of the  various com ponents of com pensation  
is generally om itted.
The th ird  objective of th is  s tu d y  is to significantly expand the 
num ber of com m ercial b an k s  being analyzed. While previous 
com pensation lite ra tu re  on b an k s  ranges betw een 20 an d  97 of the  
largest ban k s, th is  study  utilizes 450  banks. This expansion  of the  
d a ta  allows com parisons betw een m id-sized an d  the  veiy large banks, 
a s  to differences in com pensation  s tru c tu re  an d  ability of the  two 
theories to explain com pensation.
Overview of Methodology 
There are several p rocedures available for the  estim ation  of 
pooled, tim e-series, c ross-sectional or panel data . Two basic  
techniques comm only u sed  are th e  one-way fixed effects model, or 
w ith in-cases estim ator, an d  the  one-way random  effects, or error 
com ponents model, w hich is a  w ith in  and  betw een cases estim ator. 
While fixed effects m odels will generally have less efficiency, they are 
far more likely to be unb iased  an d  consisten t. Given th e  typical 
expectation of b ias in  non-experim ental or observational stud ies, th is  
trade-off for reduced b ias is very appealing.
Fixed effect m odels are also generally less restrictive th a n  the  
random  effects m odels. The random  effects m odel can  be looked a t as
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6a special case  of the  fixed effects model, one th a t  requ ires far m ore 
assum ptions.
A nother consideration  is w hich of th e  m odels can  handle 
unbalanced  d a ta  or m issing  data , as  in th is  study. B oth the  fixed 
effects an d  random  effects m odels can  hand le  unba lanced  designs 
w hich generally preserve degrees of freedom com pared to excluding 
observations to create a  balanced  panel (Batalgi & Chang, 1994). The 
fixed effects m odel is expected to be the  appropria te  m ethod  for th is  
study; however, there  is a  sta tis tica l specification te s t (H ausm an & 
Taylor, 1982) available th a t  te s ts  th e  null hypo thesis of th e  random  
effects m odel against the  fixed effects model. T his H ausm an  te s t allows 
the  d a ta  to d ictate w hich m ethod is th e  appropria te  one.
Sum m ary
The rem ainder of th is  s tudy  is p resen ted  a s  follows. C hapter 2 is 
a  review of relevant litera ture. C hap ter 3 is a  d iscussion  of the d a ta  
an d  m ethodology u sed  in  th is  study. C hap ter 4  is a  p resen ta tion  of the  
re su lts  of th is  study. And finally, C hap ter 5 p resen ts  a  sum m ary  of the  
findings, con tribu tions of the  study , and  suggestions for fu tu re  
research .
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chap ter provides a  d iscussion  of th e  two com pensation  
theories tested  in  th is  s tu d y  an d  a  review of lite ra tu re  relevant to th is  
study . Section one reviews th e  two theories, p ro fit/sh areh o ld er w ealth  
m axim ization an d  sa le s /sa le s  growth m axim ization. Section two, a  
chronological review of th e  litera ture, is divided into two p a rts . First, 
the  earlier non-banking  s tud ies  are  reviewed. Second, bank-only  
research  is reviewed. Finally, the  ch ap te r concludes w ith a  brief 
sum m ary.
C om pensation Theories 
M uch of the  em pirical research  in  executive com pensation  is 
based  on two com peting hypotheses of firm behavior. The first of these  
hypotheses, from m icro-econom ics, predicts th a t com pensation 
con trac ts  will be based  solely on the  m axim ization of firm profits. The 
second theory is B aum ol's (1959, 1962 and  1967) sales or sales 
grow th m axim ization hypothesis th a t  suggests m anagers face 
incentives th a t lead to the  m axim ization of firm sales, or
7
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8alternatively to increases in  the  ra te  of growth of firm sales. These 
com peting hypotheses, a s  well a s  the  resu lts  of em pirical te s ts  of each, 
are  d iscussed  as they evolved in  the  litera tu re.
P ro fit/S hareholder W ealth 
Maximization
The profit (or shareho lder wealth) m axim ization hypothesis is 
the  foundation for the  application of agency theory  to issu es relating to 
executive com pensation. Agency theory  s ta te s  th a t  ow ners prefer 
m anagers to act in  a  m an n e r consisten t w ith shareholder-w ealth  
m axim ization (Jensen  & Meckling, 1976; Fam a, 1980). Because, in 
general, m anagers ' actions are  no t readily  observable; one can  argue 
th a t financial perform ance, profits or changes in  shareho lder wealth, 
provides an  observable signal of m anagerial effort. The preceding 
description b roadens c lassical m icroeconom ic theory  th a t predicts 
CEO com pensation will be s tru c tu red  to induce only profit-m axim izing 
decisions by m anagers. C lassical theory  does n o t consider strategic 
play by either m anagers or owners, no r does c lassical theory  consider 
o ther agency costs, su ch  as costly contracting  or the  costs of 
m onitoring agents. R esearch in  th is  field often seeks to identify the 
effects of these  types of agency theory factors on incentive s tru c tu res .
The m ost com m on signal of m anagerial effort th a t  is proposed in 
the  lite ra tu re  is firm profits. This research  relies on various m easu res 
of firm profitability, often concentra ting  on shareho lder re tu rn  or the
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9accounting profits of the  firm. Som e research , su c h  as M urphy (1985) 
and  Barro an d  Barro (1990), ind icates th a t re su lts  obtained  using  
e ither of these  m easu res of perform ance do no t differ qualitatively. 
However, the  question  of w h a t is the  b e s t m easu re  of firm perform ance 
is no t yet resolved. Also, em pirical research  often produces 
contradictory  answ ers to the  question  of how  ow ners s tru c tu re  
incentive con trac ts  w ritten  betw een them selves an d  their m anagers. 
A ttem pts to estim ate the  rela tionsh ip  betw een firm  perform ance and  
m anagerial com pensation em pirically generate  wide ranging resu lts .
S a les /S a les  Growth M aximization
It is th e  w ork of Baum ol (1959, 1962 an d  1967) th a t  s ta rts  
m uch  of the  research  in  the  a rea  of com pensation. His w ork resu lts  in 
the  sales grow th (total revenue) m axim ization hypothesis, a  challenge 
to trad itional m icro-econom ic theory. B aum ol’s original hypothesis 
considers two com peting objectives of m anagers and  owners; the 
m axim ization of profits an d  sales. In the  first version of h is  model, 
Baum ol (1959) contends th a t bo th  th e  firm ’s m anagers and  its  owners 
are  concerned w ith bo th  the  profits and  sa les levels of the  firm. 
Baum ol fu rth er sta tes th a t  the  perception of the  firm held by owners, 
custom ers, an d  employees im proves a s  the size of the  firm increases. 
Access to th e  credit m arke ts also im proves an d  increases a s  firm size 
increases. The resu lt of these  factors creates incentives for both  
m anagers an d  owners to maximize th e  size of the  firm (sales, total
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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asse ts , change in  sales, etc.) a s  opposed to profit m axim ization. 
Baum ol (1962) refines th e  m odel a n d  he s ta te s  th a t "m axim ization of 
the  rate  of growth of sa les revenue seem s a  som ew hat b e tte r 
approxim ation to the  goals of m any m anagem ent groups in large firm s 
th a n  is m axim ization of the  c u rre n t level of sales" (p. 1085). In th is  
upda ted  model, an  equilibrium  ra te  of growth of sa les is determ ined  
th a t  m axim izes Total Revenue m in u s Total Costs. By using  grow th ra te  
of sales, profit m axim ization is no longer a  constra in t. In the  long run , 
it becom es an  in strum en ta l variable. Baum ol a sse rts  th a t, in  the  long 
ru n , profits a re  only necessary  to help  raise capital to fund  fu rther 
growth th rough  direct re ten tion  or as dividends to induce fu tu re  
outside investors to invest in  th e  firm. Also, beyond som e point 
(equilibrium  growth rate), profits com pete w ith sales. Baum ol also 
investigates the  effect of governm ent actions to prom ote economic 
activity and  how these  actions w ould in te rac t w ith h is model. Using 
com parative sta tics, he analyzes th e  effect of in te res t ra te  changes and  
subsidies. Both variables are  im portan t to th e  bank ing  industry . 
Obviously, m ost of a  b a n k ’s revenue is derived from in te res t incom e 
an d  subsid ies are received in  the  form  of Federal Deposit In su rance  
an d  investm ent tax  credits. D ecreases in  in te res t ra tes or increased  
subsid ies resu lt in  increased  equilibrium  sales growth ra tes, w hich 
lead to increased  com pensation for th e  CEO. Som e em pirical research
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designed to investigate the  rela tionsh ip  betw een sa les and  
com pensation follows.
Em pirical L iterature 
The m easu re  of com pensation  frequently  u sed  in  earlier research  
is the  sum  of sa lary  an d  bo n u s paym ents m ade to executives. 
Basically, the  su m  of sa lary  and  b o n u s paym ents provides a  m easu re  
of the  cash  com pensation  paid to executives by firm owners. Later 
stud ies add m easu res of com pensation  th a t include estim ates of the  
change of sh a re  value resu lting  from executive stock  ow nership or the  
value of stock options aw arded to the  executives. Following is a  survey 
of relevant lite ra tu re  trac ing  the  evolution of research  on the  two 
theories of com pensation  u n d e r investigation in  th is  study.
Non-Banking L iterature
McGuire, Chiu, an d  Elbing (1962) tes t B aum ol's original 1959 
sales-revenue-m axim ization hypothesis ag a in st the  profit 
m axim ization hypothesis. The a u th o rs ’ d a ta  se t consists of 45 of the 
largest in d u stria l firm s in  the  United S ta tes covering a  seven year 
period (1953-1959). The d a ta  se t includes executive com pensation, 
sales, and  accounting  profits for firm s from a variety  of industries. The 
au th o rs  acknowledge a  potential for b ias  resu lting  from the inclusion 
of only the  largest firms in  the  U.S.; th en  claim  th a t  a  "careful analysis 
of the  figures does no t reveal su ch  a  bias" (p. 754). The a u th o rs  do not
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add ress the  potential problem  of in d u stry  specific b iases th a t m ay 
obscure resu lts.
The com pensation d a ta  (dependent variable) is base  sa lary  and  
the  value of stock  gran ts. The d a ta  se t includes only the  CEO position 
w hen  stock is g ran ted  a s  p a rt of th e  com pensation  package. The 
au th o rs  com pute the  m arke t value of th e  stock u sin g  the  closing stock 
price on D ecem ber 31 of the  year in  w hich th e  stock  is granted. 
Explanatory variables u sed  in  the ir seven regression  m odels include 
sales and  accounting  profits and  one- an d  tw o-year lagged versions of 
these  variables. The a u th o rs  find th a t  executive com pensation is 
strongly affected by sales b u t is generally no t re la ted  to profits. The 
au th o rs  indicate th a t there  m ay be additional variables affecting 
executive incom es and, in spite of th e ir resu lts , do n o t w an t to ru le ou t 
the  possibility of a  relationship  betw een profits an d  executive pay. 
While the  a u th o rs  find strong  evidence to su p p o rt B aum ol's sales- 
m axim ization hypothesis, they  have an o th e r in teresting  resu lt. They 
find th a t CEO pay is no t only a function  of c u rre n t sales, b u t  also is 
strongly related  to p a s t sales, even w hen a  new  CEO assum es 
com m and. While th is seem s to con trad ic t the  sales-m axim ization 
model, the  au th o rs  s ta te  th a t th is  re su lt could be from no t testing  
individual com ponents of com pensation, e.g. base  versu s b o n u s pay, 
etc.
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Lewellen and  H u n tsm an  (1970) te s t th e  original version of 
B aum ol's sales m axim ization hypo thesis again st trad itiona l profit 
m axim ization. The au th o rs  collected c ross sectional d a ta  a t th ree  year 
in tervals from 1942-63 for fifty veiy diverse m anufactu ring  firm s. The 
a u th o rs  ru n  several cross sectional regressions for each  sam ple period 
u sin g  various specifications.
In one specification, th e  explanatory  variables include reported  
after-tax  accounting  profits an d  the  dollar value of sales; while, in 
another, the  explanatory variables include the  m arke t value of 
ou tstand ing  com m on stock  an d  the  dollar value of sales. E ach  of these  
variables is analyzed ag a in st two different m easu res of executive 
com pensation. The first m easu re  of com pensation  includes only cash  
com pensation  paym ents, sa lary  p lu s bonus. The second com pensation  
m easu re  includes the  su m  of sa lary  an d  bonus an d  a  m easu re  of the  
value of deferred com pensation. To correct for he teroskedasticity  of the 
residuals, all variables in  each  of th e  four regressions are divided by 
the  firm ’s a sse t value. Regression equations are estim ated  for each of 
the  eight tim e periods and, in  th irty  of thirty-tw o to ta l regressions, the 
estim ated  coefficients for the  profit m easu res  are  statistically  
significant. However, the  a u th o rs  repo rt th a t the  sa les coefficient is not 
sta tistically  different from zero in  any  of the  estim ated  regressions. 
T hus, the au th o rs  find strong  su p p o rt for p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth
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m axim ization b u t no evidence to su p p o rt th e  sales-m axim ization 
hypothesis.
As em pirical resea rch  on com pensation  m oves into th e  1980’s, 
researchers in s titu te  controls for the  scale of th e  firm an d  begin to 
incorporate the  growth ra te  of sales into em pirical m odels. C oughlan 
and  Schm idt (1985) is one of the  first s tud ies  to u se  sales growth in  an  
a ttem pt to identify B aum ol’s (1962) hypothesized positive relationship  
betw een sales growth an d  com pensation. O ther resea rch  innovations, 
su ch  as allowing the  regression  in tercep ts to vary  across firms, are  
in tended to cap tu re  the  rela tionship  betw een th e  size of the  firm and  
the  level of effort or h u m an  capital expended by m anagers. In th is  way, 
scale m ay be u sed  a s  a su b s titu te  for th e  complexity of the  m anager’s 
position. Baum ol argues th a t the  rela tionship  betw een sales growth 
and  com pensation  is independen t of scale. If th e  rela tionsh ip  betw een 
sales growth an d  com pensation is co n stan t across firms, allowing 
in tercepts to vary across firm s after ad justing  for scale will yield 
unb iased  regression  estim ators.
D uring th is  period of time, o ther researchers  suggest th a t  once a  
firm h as  achieved som e m inim um  level of profitability, regardless of 
scale, the m anager is free to participate  in  activities th a t maximize h is 
utility, ra th e r  th a n  the  utility  of the owner (Jensen  & Meckling, 1976; 
M urphy, 1985). The positive rela tionship  betw een scale and  
com pensation suggests th a t  m anagers will strive to m axim ize the  size
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of the  firm, because  th is  will lead  to increased  perquisites. These 
researchers suggest th a t m anagers face incentives to maximize sales 
th a t are independen t of, or a t b est w eakly correlated to, the  incentives 
created by th e  m anager's  com pensation  contract. In fact, w hen 
researchers control for firm size, generally there  is less evidence of a  
correlation betw een firm perform ance and  executive com pensation  
(Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, & Hinkin, 1987). Som e em pirical research  
designed to investigate the  sa les ve rsu s profits re la tionsh ip  to 
com pensation while ad justing  for firm  scale is a s  follows.
Hirschey an d  Pappas (1981) m ake an  early a ttem pt to in tegrate  
scale effects by dividing the ir sam ple  into four quartiles, u sing  life 
cycle theory, an d  th en  testing  th e  profit-versus-sales m axim ization 
controversy. Life cycle theory a sse rts  th a t  young industria l firm s would 
maximize revenue growth, while those  in  their late stages of life would 
maximize profit. Life cycle theory fu rth e r s ta te s  th a t sm aller firm s 
maximize sales in  order to gain the  m arke t sh a re  necessary  for long- 
ru n  profit m axim ization, while larger firm s in  m atu re  m arke ts 
maximize profits. The au th o rs  compile the ir d a ta  se t of 680 large firm s 
from Forbes M agazine's 1977 a n n u a l survey of CEO com pensation. 
The d a ta  se t includes 155 b an k s an d  82 utilities so th a t inform ation 
from the m ore heavily regulated  firm s could be com pared to re su lts  for 
industria l firms. B anks face no explicit profit lim itations, unlike 
utilities, b u t bo th  do face m any o th er regulatory  restric tions th a t
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m ight resu lt in  very different outcom es. The s tu d y ’s com pensation  
variable includes salary  p lu s b o n u s p lu s deferred com pensation  an d  
th e  independen t variables for the  s tu d y  are net incom e after taxes an d  
to ta l revenues.
R esults for the  in d u stria l firm s show ed strong  su p p o rt for profit 
m axim ization; however, only the  sm aller and  younger firm s supported  
B aum ol’s sales m axim ization theory. For banks, there  is m ild su p p o rt 
for CEOs to p u rsu e  profits and  c lear sup p o rt for utility  CEOs to 
p u rsu e  sales m axim ization. There is also clear evidence th a t CEOs of 
regulated industrie s receive substan tia lly  less in  a n n u a l 
com pensation. A w eakness of th is  s tu d y  is the  ra th e r  crude a ttem p t to 
control for firm scale by using  quartiles. This stu d y  did shed  insight 
into the validity of the  life cycle hypothesis.
Carroll an d  Ciscel (1982) a sk  if regulated  in d u strie s  appear to 
behave differently th a n  th e ir less regulated  coun te rparts . They tes t the  
two com pensation  theories u sing  d a ta  from 221 in d u stria l firms, 45 
utilities, and  21 tran sp o rta tio n  firm s during  th e  period 1970-1976. 
The regression dependen t variable, executive com pensation, is 
m easu red  by only salary  p lu s b o n u s of the  firm s’ CEOs. Independen t 
variables are sa les and  residual profit and  dum m y variables for the  
utility  and  tran spo rta tion  firms. R esidual profit is defined as n e t 
profits th a t canno t be a ttrib u ted  to sales.
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The a u th o rs ’ first finding is th a t regulation sub stan tia lly  reduces 
an n u a l com pensation  of th e  CEO. Second, the  sa les variable is highly 
significant every year in  explaining the  level of com pensation, 
supporting  the  sa le s /sa le s  growth m axim ization theory. This holds 
tru e  for bo th  regulated a n d  less regulated  firms. Finally, residual 
profits are significant only two of the  six years for the  entire sam ple, 
indicating no overall su p p o rt for p ro fit/sh areh o ld er w ealth 
m axim ization. However, com pensation  in tran sp o rta tio n  firm s is 
positively rela ted  to profits b u t  is negatively re la ted  to profits for 
utilities.
M urphy (1985) expresses concern  abou t previous resea rch  being 
largely unsuccessfu l in linking executive com pensation  to corporate 
perform ance using  either profits or shareho lder w ealth . He po in ts ou t 
th a t  m any m anagers hold large fractions of their w ealth  in  th e  form of 
the ir com panies’ stock. M urphy also a sse rts  the  positive relationship  
betw een firm profits and  stock  price m ovem ents. In conclusion, he 
contends th a t, even if no d irect link betw een firm  perform ance and  
cash  com pensation is found, the  m anager's  ow nership of stock  implies 
th a t the w ealth  of m anagers is indirectly linked to firm  perform ance.
M urphy ga thers d a ta  covering th e  period 1964-1981 to analyze 
the  relationship  betw een firm perform ance an d  executive 
com pensation. His sam ple includes 461 executives from  72 firms. The 
sam ple includes only firm s w here a t least th ree  executives ap p ea r on
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the  firm 's proxy sta tem en ts  for a  m in im um  of five years. The final d a ta  
se t includes over 4 ,500 “executive y ea rs” of observations. M urphy 
defines firm perform ance a s  the  to ta l a n n u a l ra te  of re tu rn  realized by 
the  firm 's com m on stock owners.
The a u th o r’s m odel of m anagerial com pensation  depends on the  
size of the  firm in  question, p a s t firm  perform ance an d  th e  innate  
ability of m anagers (not specifically m easured). M urphy poin ts ou t th a t 
if the  effects of u n m easu red  variables on com pensation  are  not 
constan t across firm s/executives, re su lts  based  on  cross section d a ta  
will exhibit om itted variable bias. If these  variables are  co n stan t across 
tim e for a  given executive, then , by analyzing th e  tim e series d a ta  for 
specific executives, the  relationship  betw een perform ance and  pay will 
be correct. For these  reasons, M urphy estim ates th e  perform ance-pay 
relationship  for specific executives u sin g  panel d a ta  in  a  generalized 
fixed effects model.
M urphy u ses  several different m easu res  of com pensation, 
including salary, sa lary  p lu s bonus, deferred com pensation  paym ents, 
value of stock  options, an d  total com pensation. Total com pensation 
includes all o ther m easures, as well a s  the  value of fringe benefits and  
savings p lans. The resu lts  indicate a  positive re la tionsh ip  betw een the 
firm 's stock price perform ance and  executive com pensation. If simple 
cross sectional m ethods are used , resu lts  indicate  a n  inverse
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relationship  betw een com pensation  an d  stock  price. M urphy suggests 
th a t th is inverse rela tionsh ip  is from neglecting to control for firm size.
M urphy no tes th a t ow ners of large firm s are  likely to pay the ir 
executives m ore th a n  are  ow ners of sm all firms, regardless of the  
perform ance of the  firms. He suggests th a t  these  pay differences are 
sim ply the  resu lt of differences in  the  level of effort and  h u m an  capital 
required  in m anaging large firm s as com pared  to sm all firms.
M urphy finds th a t the  variable w ith th e  g reatest power to 
explain changes in bo th  cash  com pensation  an d  to ta l com pensation  is 
the  com m on shareho lders’ realized a n n u a l re tu rn . Specifically, a  10% 
increase in  th e  value of a  firm 's com m on stock yields an  increase  in 
to ta l com pensation of 2.1%. M urphy also repo rts th a t the  grow th of 
firm sales is positively and  significantly rela ted  to executive 
com pensation, supporting  Baum ol (1962), an d  estim ates a 10% 
increase in sa les resu lts  in  a  1.6% increase  in com pensation. Overall, 
M urphy finds evidence to suggest th a t  changes in  the  price of a firm 's 
com m on stock is the  b e s t predictor of changes in executive to tal 
com pensation.
A second paper investigating th e  profit m axim ization hypothesis 
is C oughlan an d  Schm idt (1985). This study  m ore narrow ly defines 
com pensation as changes in  base sa lary  p lus bonus. Unlike M urphy 
(1985), deferred com pensation  and  stock  options are no t included. The 
prim ary  goal of C oughlan an d  Schm idt is to firmly estab lish  a  link
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betw een stock price perform ance an d  m anagerial com pensation. The 
au th o rs  also desire to u se  a  variable th a t does no t include factors 
beyond the m anagers’ control. B ecause stock  price changes also 
include general econom ic conditions, regulatory  changes, etc., 
Coughlan an d  Schm idt u se  cum ulative abnorm al stock  re tu rn s  to 
m ore closely m easu re  m an ag ers’ d irect effect on  shareho lder w ealth. 
Also, due to M urphy (1985) and  o ther stud ies, th e  a u th o rs  include the  
real rate  of grow th of sa les in  the ir regression model; however, they 
te s t a  hypothesis th a t th e  inclusion of sa les grow th will no t negate or 
reduce to insignificance th e  stock perform ance variable.
Coughlan and  Schm idt collect d a ta  on 249 corporations over 
th ree  years resu lting  in  597 usab le  observations. The dependan t 
variable is changes in  com pensation, th u s  CEOs h ad  to rem ain  in 
place at least two years. R esults yield a  very significant rela tionship  
betw een abnorm al stock  price perform ance a n d  changes in  CEO 
com pensation. Sales growth is also significantly re la ted  to changes in 
CEO pay and  only m inim ally reduces th e  stock  re tum -com pensa tion  
relationship.
The prim ary concern  of W inn and  S hoenhair (1988) is th a t 
earlier work does no t separa te  firm scale from grow th ra te  of sales. 
Their d a ta  se t includes m ore th a n  200 m anufactu ring  firms an d  covers 
the  period from 1968-1981. To tes t th e  effects of growth ra tes, the  
au th o rs  b reak  the  d a ta  se t into three equal tim e periods, each covering
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five years w ith  241, 222 and  213 firm s in  each  of the  respective 
sam ples. The a u th o rs  th en  analyze th e  effects of scale (log of to tal 
assets) and  grow th ra te s  of bo th  profits an d  sales on executive 
com pensation.
The a u th o rs  focus only on the  incentives created  by the  board  of 
directors th ro u g h  the  com pensation  con tract, th u s , the  analysis 
includes only cash  paym ents. Stock ow nership, w hich can  be obtained 
outside the  com pensation  contract by CEO p u rch ases, is ignored. The 
au th o rs  also po in t ou t th a t  sa laries of newly h ired  CEOs are no t likely 
to be affected by the  perform ance of the  firm prior to the ir hiring 
(contradictory to McGuire, et. al., 1962). Therefore, the  s tu d y  trea ts  
firm s w ith newly h ired  CEOs as a  control group.
R esults sup p o rt th a t, for firm s w ith  veteran  CEOs, 
com pensation is positively related to the  grow th ra te  of profits. 
E stim ates of the  effects of the  profit growth ra te  on com pensation are 
even greater th a n  reported by Je n se n  an d  M urphy (1990), (discussed 
later). Prior firm perform ance h as  no significant influence on the  
com pensation  of newly hired CEOs. R esults also suggest th a t 
m anagers are  rew arded for scale b u t are  penalized for increases in  the  
growth ra te  of sales. The au th o rs  argue th a t  th e ir re su lts  do no t 
necessarily  refute sa le s /sa le s  grow th m axim ization b u t, in  fact, 
sup p o rt B aum ol’s (1959) contention th a t  m anagers m ay indeed have 
non-pecun iaiy  incentives to increase revenue. Finally, it is accounting-
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b ased  profit m easu res and  no t th e  m arke t-based  stock re tu rn s  th a t 
are significantly related to com pensation.
Agrawal, M akhija, and  M andelker (1991) investigate electric and  
gas u tilities to determ ine if these  regu la ted  firm s exhibit a  link  betw een 
profitability an d  executive com pensation. They cite several previously 
reviewed stud ies  of un regu la ted  firm s th a t  find a  strong  positive link 
betw een com pensation an d  profits. Therefore, the  a u th o rs  feel th a t 
H irschey and  Pappas (1981) an d  Carroll and  Ciscel (1982) m ight be in 
error by no t finding a  positive rela tionsh ip  betw een com pensation  and  
profitability in  regulated firms. Agrawal, M akhija, and  M andelker 
a sse rt th a t regulated  industries, like th e ir  less regulated  coun te rparts , 
write perform ance incentive co n trac ts  th a t link  com pensation  and  
profits.
The a u th o rs  collect d a ta  on 69 electric an d  gas u tilities from 
1975-1984. They argue th a t properly specified variables m ight yield 
m ore accura te  resu lts . The a u th o rs ’ dependen t variable is grow th in 
to ta l an n u al com pensation w hich also includes stocks, options, 
deferred com pensation an d  o ther rem uneration . Following G ibbons 
and  M urphy (1990), their independen t variable is an  industry -ad ju sted  
ra te  of re tu rn . They also te s t the  sa le s /sa le s  growth m axim ization 
theory  of com pensation by including a  sales growth variable.
Their findings suppo rt the  view th a t com pensation packages 
align the in te res ts  of top m anagem ent w ith shareholders. A strong
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positive re la tionsh ip  betw een executive com pensation  and  firm 
profitability is found, in  co n tra st to previous s tu d ies  of regulated  firm s 
(Hirschey & Pappas, 1981; Carroll and  Ciscel, 1982) th a t find no 
relation, or a  negative relation, betw een com pensation  and  
profitability.
Je n se n  an d  M urphy (1990a) also analyze the  relationship  
betw een firm  perform ance and  two m easu res  of com pensation. 
M easures of com pensation  u sed  include the  su m  of sa lary  an d  bo n u s 
(cash com pensation), an d  the  su m  of salary, bonus, the  value of 
restric ted  stock  and  fringe benefits (total com pensation). The a u th o rs  
define the pay-perform ance sensitivity, “b ,” to be the  dollar change in 
the  CEOs w ealth  per dollar change in  the  w ealth  of the  shareholders. 
The au th o rs  claim  th a t a  h igher degree of sensitivity  im plies th a t the  
com pensation con tract re su lts  in  m anagerial incentives th a t are m ore 
closely aligned w ith the incentives of owners.
The b ase  sam ple for th is  s tu d y  consists of sa lary  an d  bonuses 
for 2,505 CEOs in  1,400 publicly held  com panies from 1974 th rough  
1988 and stock  option d a ta  on CEOs in  the  430  largest com panies in  
1988. Je n se n  and  M urphy sta te  th a t, despite head lines a t the  time, 
top executives are  no t receiving record salaries an d  bonuses. They find 
CEO pay levels are  ju s t  now catching u p  to w here they are 50 years 
ago. During th e  period betw een 1934 th rough  1938, average sa laries
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an d  bonuses for NYSE listed  CEOs are  $882,000, 1988 dollars. For the  
period 1982 th rough  1988, the  average is $843,000.
Also, despite popu lar claim s th a t pay  is no t linked to 
perform ance, Je n se n  an d  M urphy find th a t  for the  250 largest 
com panies, a  $1,000 change in  corporate value corresponds to a  
change of 6 .7  cents in  sa lary  an d  b o n u ses over 2 years. If all 
com pensation sources are  include (stock options, stockholdings, etc.), 
a  $1,000 increase  in  shareho lder value re su lts  in  a  $2 .59  increase in 
CEO w ealth. The a u th o rs  also find evidence to p redict th a t  th is  pay- 
perform ance relationship  is increasing  over tim e. In com parison, Hall 
an d  Liebm an (1998) u se  Je n se n  an d  M urphy’s m ethodology on a  
larger and  m ore recen t d a ta  se t an d  find th a t average CEO w ealth  will 
increase by $25.11 for every $1 ,000  increase in  shareho lder w ealth, an  
average a lm ost 8 tim es greater. This su p p o rts  a  tren d  observed in  the  
1990’s by m any  au th o rs  th a t the  p ro fit/sh a re-h o ld er m axim ization 
theory  is becom ing even m ore im portan t over time.
Je n se n  and  M urphy s ta te  th a t  the  m ost powerful link betw een 
shareho lder w ealth  and  executive w ealth  is d irect stock  ow nership by 
the  CEO. Yet, CEO stock  ow nership, as a percentage of sh a res  
ou tstand ing , is 10 tim es greater in  th e  1930s th a n  in  the  1980s. These 
au th o rs  also argue th a t non-m onetary  rew ards, perquisites, typically 
m otivate m anagers to take actions th a t  reduce productivity and  h arm  
shareho lders. Thus, m onetary  com pensation  an d  stock  ow nership
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rem ain  the  m ost effective tools to align m anager an d  shareho lder 
in terests. They did find th a t  m anagers of relatively sm all firm s have 
com pensation m ore closely tied to firm perform ance, th a n  do 
m anagers of relatively large firms. The a u th o rs  con tend  th a t  a lthough 
they  find a w eak positive re la tionsh ip  betw een pay an d  perform ance, 
the  streng th  of th a t  rela tionsh ip  is n o t sufficient to solve the  principal- 
agent problem. In sum m ary, J e n s e n  and  M urphy conclude th a t 
m anagem ent com pensation  is dependen t on firm perform ance.
As research  m oves th rough  the  1990’s, testing  of B aum ol’s 
sa le s /sa le s  growth m axim ization theory  a lm ost d isappears. Sales is 
som etim es u sed  as a  “size control” variable in  s tu d ies  of o ther theories 
of com pensation, su ch  as b o a rd  com position or ow nership 
concentration; however, th e  sa le s /s a le s  growth m axim ization theory is 
n o t d iscussed  or explicitly tested , even in bank ing  stud ies. E m phasis 
on pay for perform ance, especially using  m arke t-based  variables, 
ten d s to dom inate the  non-bank ing  literature.
B anking L iterature
H ubbard  and  Palia (1995) exam ine CEO pay in  the  banking  
industry  and  the effect of deregulation on th e  pay-perform ance 
relationship . A nother s ta ted  goal is to study  th e  bank ing  in d u stry  to 
determ ine w hether CEO pay is excessive or necessary  to a ttrac t 
m anagerial talen t. The a u th o rs  d iscu ss extensively the  evidence in  the  
non-banking  stud ies of the  link betw een pay-perform ance and  th e ir
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goal of investigating, especially after deregulation, if the  pay- 
perform ance link also exists for banks.
Panel d a ta  is collected on 97 b a n k s  from  36 s ta te s  for the  years 
1980-1989. To control for bank-specific om itted variables, each b a n k  
is allowed to have a  sep ara te  in tercep t term , like J e n se n  and  M urphy 
(1990b). Also, each observation is differenced from the  m ean  for th a t 
variable to allow a  type of fixed effects m odel in  the  analysis. The 
dependent variable, CEO com pensation, is th e  su m  of b ase  salary  p lu s 
bonus paym ents. Independent variables are  to ta l a sse ts  (to control for 
size effects), change in  shareho lder w ealth  (perform ance variable) and  
a  dum m y variable, rep resen ting  significant in te rs ta te  banking  
deregulation. H ubbard  and  Palia indicate  th a t  m any stud ies  do no t 
include a  size variable because  of the  po ten tial correlation betw een 
firm size an d  perform ance. They include a  size variable to exam ine 
w hether m ore rapidly growing b a n k s  have CEOs w ith h igher levels of 
Pay-
Two m odels are  tested , the  full d a ta  se t an d  a su b se t consisting 
of b anks w ith no CEO turnover. For bo th  m odels, a  significant positive 
relationship  is estab lished  betw een shareho lder w ealth  and  CEO 
com pensation, supporting  the p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth  m axim ization 
hypothesis. The a u th o rs  find an  increase  in  a  b an k  CEO’s salary  of 
12.9 cen ts per $1,000 increase in  shareho lder w ealth. This is 
com parable to previous stud ies th a t range betw een 1.35 cen ts and  15
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
27
cents per $1 ,000  change in shareho lder w ealth . They also find th is  
relationship  betw een shareho lder w ealth  and  com pensation  
streng thens as in te rs ta te  bank ing  is perm itted . Size is also positively 
and  significantly rela ted  to com pensation. The au th o rs  s ta te  th a t th is  
suggests th a t  CEOs of m ore rapidly  growing b a n k s  have m ore 
generous sa lary  and  b o n u s packages. R esults of the  second model, no 
CEO turnover, are  alm ost identical to the  full model. The a u th o rs  
conclude th a t  concerns abou t CEO tu rnover affecting the  pay- 
perform ance link  m ay be overstated. In sum m ary , a  significant positive 
relationship  is estab lished  betw een shareho lder w ealth  and  CEO 
com pensation, supporting  the  p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth  m axim ization 
theory. The next study  investigates various perform ance m easu res  
related to p ro fit/shareho lder w ealth  m axim ization th a t  could be 
related  to bank ing  CEO pay.
Tripp and  Kenny (1995) exam ine CEO pay in  the  bank ing  
industry  w ith only one goal, to determ ine w hether CEO pay is linked to 
perform ance. Their m otivation is “... are shareho lders getting th e ir 
m oney’s w orth  from their CEOs?” (p. 72). C onsequently, only th e  
p ro fit/sha reho lder w ealth  m axim ization theory  is tested . The a u th o rs  
do investigate two m arke t-based  and  one accoun ting-based  
perform ance m easu res to determ ine which, if any, is b e s t in  predicting 
growth in  b a n k  CEO com pensation.
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A sam ple of the  25 largest com m ercial b a n k s  is selected and  
analyzed over a  5-year period, 1988-1992. S u b seq u en t to the  
selection, one bank , Citicorp, is determ ined  to be an  outlier and  is 
dropped from the  sam ple. The dependen t variable, CEO com pensation, 
is the  su m  of base  sa lary  p lu s bo n u s paym ents. E xplanatory  
perform ance variables are  one-year total shareho lder re tu rn , the  
previous year’s one-year to tal shareho lder re tu rn , and  change in 
accounting  re tu rn  on equity  or earn ings yield, i.e., earn ings per 
sh a re /sh a re  price t-1. Tripp and  Kenny use  bo th  m arke t-based  an d  
accounting-based  m easu res of perform ance, citing earlier stud ies, 
su ch  as Barro an d  Barro (1990). These earlier s tu d ies  argue th a t each  
type of perform ance m easu res could provide independen t inform ation 
regarding CEO perform ance. C u rren t shareho lder re tu rn , a  m easu re  of 
cu rren t CEO perform ance, is included because  it should  be rela ted  to 
cu rren t bo n u s pay. The previous y ear’s shareho lder re tu rn , a  m easu re  
of p a s t CEO perform ance, is include because  it shou ld  be related  to 
cu rren t base  salary  pay.
The previous-year shareho lder re tu rn  is significantly rela ted  to 
cu rren t to ta l com pensation, as  defined in  th is  s tudy  (p-value = 
0.0068). The curren t-year shareho lder re tu rn  is mildly rela ted  to 
cu rren t to ta l com pensation (p-value = 0.0826). E arn ings yield is 
insignificant, con tra iy  to previous non -bank  stud ies cited by the  
au tho rs . Overall, for the  banking  industry , Tripp and  Kenny find a
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strong link betw een pay an d  perform ance, a s m easu red  by re tu rn s  to 
shareholders. This re su lt does provide su p p o rt for the  
p ro fit/sha reho lder w ealth  m axim ization theory, b u t  again  reflects the  
problem: “W hich perform ance m easu re  is the b e s t proxy?”
Sigler an d  Porterfield (2001) exam ine th e  re la tionsh ip  betw een 
the  pay of b a n k  CEOs an d  b an k  perform ance. They claim  to extend the  
research  of prior s tud ies  by focusing on a  te s t period w hich begins 
after the deregulation of th e  bank ing  industry . The stu d y  investigates 
a sam ple of 31 large b a n k s  from 1988-1997, a  period in  w hich b an k s 
did no t face the  stric t regulation  experienced prior to 1982. A nother 
goal of the  stu d y  is to expand the  n u m b er of possible pay-perform ance 
variables.
Total com pensation  as defined by the Forbes M agazine’s  a n n u a l 
com pensation survey includes base  salary, bonus, fringe benefits and  
the  value of exercisable stock  options. The a u th o rs  te s t bo th  to tal 
com pensation and  changes in  to ta l com pensation. Explanatory  
variables include CEO tenure , re tu rn  on average asse ts , CAPM Beta 
and  change in  revenue. The a u th o rs  expect a  positive rela tionship  
betw een all explanatory variables an d  the two m easu res of to tal 
com pensation. Change in  revenue is a  tes t of B aum ol’s (1959 and  
1967) sa le s /sa le s  growth m axim ization theory; yet, n e ither he  nor h is 
theory is referenced in  th is  paper.
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W hen change in to ta l com pensation  is evaluated, the  only 
significant variable is re tu rn  on average a sse ts , w hich does lend 
support to the  p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth  m axim ization theory. This 
m odel found th a t a  0.1% increase  in  a sse t re tu rn  on average would 
yield a $93,870 increase in  CEO to ta l pay. W hen to ta l com pensation is 
investigated, bo th  re tu rn  on average a sse ts  an d  change in  revenue are 
significant. For th is  model, a  0.1% increase  in  a sse t re tu rn  on average 
w ould yield a  $132,100 increase  in  CEO to tal pay  and  a  $10 million 
increase in  sa les revenue would increase  CEO pay by $1,700. A uthors 
conclude th a t, in  th is  post-deregulation  period, they  found very strong 
linkages betw een pay an d  perform ance in  the  bank ing  industry . The 
significance of re tu rn  on average a sse ts  provides su p p o rt for the  
p ro fit/sha reho lder w ealth  m axim ization theory. While the  sa le s /sa le s  
growth m axim ization theory  is no t acknowledged as being tested, the  
significance of sales, in  the  to ta l com pensation  model, provides 
sup p o rt for th is  theory.
The preceding th ree  stud ies focused on the  pay-perform ance 
relationship  and  all found su p p o rt for various perform ance related 
m easu res  an d  no suppo rt for o thers. The final two papers also focus 
on the  sensitivity of CEO com pensation  to perform ance; however, they  
s tu d y  th is  in  conjunction w ith m ajor regulatory events.
Vafeas, W aegelein and  Papam ichael (2003) investigate the  
im pact of the  Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 (RRA) on b an k  CEO
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com pensation. The RRA lim its th e  deductibility  of executive pay, by 
the  firm, to $1 million u n less  sa id  pay  is in the  form of a  com m ission 
or is perform ance based . These perform ance goals m u st also be se t by 
outside directors and  approved by the  shareholders. The au th o rs  
expect to find a link betw een pay  an d  perform ance th a t  increases in  
significance in  the post-RRA period.
In th is  investigation, a  sam ple of 94 large com m ercial b a n k s  are 
stud ied  during  the  period from 1989-1997. CEO com pensation, 
collected from proxy sta tem en ts, is defined by base  p lus b o n u s pay. A 
second “com pensation” m odel u se s  th e  CEO’s stake  in  the  firm, the  
p resen t value of all options cu rren tly  held. Both com pensation  
m easu res are  transform ed to th e ir n a tu ra l log. E xplanatory  variables, 
from C om pustat, in tended  to cap tu re  the  pay-perform ance 
relationship , are  re tu rn  on a sse ts  an d  one year shareho lder re tu rn . 
The log of sa les is included as a  “size” control variable. The inclusion  of 
sa les shou ld  be a tes t for the  su p p o rt of the  sa le s /sa le s  growth 
m axim ization theory, b u t again, no m ention  of the  theory or citation  of 
Baum ol’s w ork is included. The a u th o rs  s ta te  th a t a  fixed effects 
regression is used  to analyze th e ir models; however, they  include 
num erous dum m y variables.
In the  base-p lus-bonus-com pensation  model, re tu rn  on a sse ts  is 
highly significant overall b u t is only mildly significant in  the  post-RRA 
period. Shareholder w ealth  is no t significant in any  period for
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explaining cash  CEO com pensation. Sales are  highly significant in all 
periods. In the  ‘value of op tions’ com pensation  model, bo th  sales and  
shareho lder re tu rn  a re  significant in only the  post-RRA period. 
A uthors s ta te  th a t all of these  findings suppo rt the  pay-perform ance 
linkage for banks. They fu rth er contend th a t  the  pay-perform ance 
linkage is s treng thened  due  to re su lts  of th e ir ‘option value’ model. 
Overall, these  a u th o rs  find su p p o rt for bo th  the  p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er 
w ealth  m axim ization theory  and  th e  sa le s /sa le s  growth m axim ization 
theory, even though  they  do no t specifically te s t for the  second theory. 
The au th o rs  find, in  general, th a t  non -cash  pay is su b s titu ted  for cash  
pay after the  reform, resu lting  in option pay becom ing an  increasing 
proportion of to tal pay.
Harjoto and  M ullineaux (2003) analyze the  im pact of com m ercial 
b a n k  entry  into investm ent bank ing  on CEO com pensation. Their first 
objective is to show  a linkage betw een CEO pay an d  perform ance 
using  a m arke t based  m easu re  of perform ance. Previous stud ies have 
mixed re su lts  estab lish ing  th is  pay-perform ance link  for some 
definitions of b an k  CEO pay. Second, they  expect th e  en try  into 
investm ent banking  to resu lt in  even stronger pay-for-perform ance 
sensitivities th a n  are show n in any  previous s tu d ies  of banks.
D ata is collected on 74 of the  largest b a n k  holding com panies 
over the period 1992-2000. C om pensation d a ta  is from S tandard  & 
Poor’s Execucom p da tabase  and  explanatory  variable d a ta  is from
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S tandard  & Poor’s C om pustat. A m odel of to ta l com pensation  is 
analyzed, a s  well as, a  m odel of incentive com pensation  th a t  includes 
b o n u s pay, stock  g ran ts  an d  option pay. E xplanatory  variables include 
a  three-year shareho lder re tu rn  (to m easu re  perform ance), to ta l a sse ts  
(to control size effects), m arket-to -book  ratio (to m easu re  firm ‘growth 
options’), CEO ten u re  an d  various dum m y variables. D ue to the  
inclusion of n u m erous dum m y variables and  som e m issing  d a ta  a  one­
way, random  effects, unbalanced  panel m odel is employed.
In regard  to my c u rren t study, Harjoto an d  M ullineaux find a  
strong  positive link betw een shareho lder re tu rn  an d  bo th  m easu res of 
com pensation. A 1% increase  in shareho lder re tu rn  re su lts  in an  
increase of $8 ,380  of to ta l com pensation  or a n  increase  of $7 ,950 of 
incentive com pensation. E ntry  into in te rsta te  bank ing  resu lts  in  
fu rth er increases in com pensation. Overall, th e  au th o rs  find strong 
suppo rt for the  p ro fit/shareho lder w ealth  m axim ization theory.
Sum m ary
This ch ap ter begins w ith a  d iscussion  of the  two theories of 
com pensation being investigated in  the  c u rre n t study, the  
p ro fit/shareho lder w ealth  m axim ization theory an d  the  sa le s /sa le s  
growth m axim ization theory. Next, relevant com pensation  lite ra tu re  in 
the  non-banking  area  is presented , followed by bank ing  com pensation
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research . C hapter 3 provides hypo theses developm ent, m odel selection 
an d  methodology.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
This ch ap ter p resen ts  five m ain  sections. F irst, re su lts  of prior 
research  and  observed opportun ities to extend th is  research  are u sed  
to develop testab le  hypotheses. Second, the  m odel specification and  
variables needed to te s t the  aforem entioned hypo theses are  p resented . 
Third, d a ta  sources an d  variable definitions a re  d iscussed . Fourth , a  
description of the  sta tis tica l methodology to be u sed  in  testing  the  
hypotheses is p resen ted . This ch ap ter concludes w ith a  brief 
sum m ary.
H ypotheses Developm ent 
Referring to the  previous research  in C hap te r Two, m ost s tud ies 
tes ts  Total CEO C om pensation. The definition of w hat is included as 
“Total” com pensation  varies, b u t from the 1960s th rough  the  1980s, 
“salary” an d  “b o n u s” are  the  p rim ary  com ponents. Occasionally, 
“deferred” or “o ther” pay is included to expand th e  definition of the  
“Total” com pensation  variable. It is only during  th is  period th a t the  
p ro fit/shareho lder w ealth  m axim ization an d  sa le s /sa le s  growth 
m axim ization theories are bo th  explicitly tested  in the
35
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research. Even so, resu lts  for bo th  theories are  mixed, w ith p e rh ap s 
slightly m ore suppo rt for the  p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth  m axim ization 
theory.
The g rea test deficiency in  s tu d ies  during  th is  period is th a t the  
definition of to ta l com pensation  includes only cash  com ponents. 
A nother lim itation is th a t only one s tu d y  includes any b an k s (Hirschey 
and  Pappas, 1981). D uring th is period, bo th  theories of com pensation  
are included. Overall, fu rth er resea rch  is needed.
Moving th rough  the  1990s to th e  present; options, stock, an d  
o ther fringe benefits are  also incorporated  into th e  definition of Total 
com pensation. However, te s ts  of th e  sa le s /s a le s  growth m axim ization 
theory are dropped. S tudies of com pensation  generally include one 
variable represen ting  the  p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth  m axim ization 
theory, a  size-control variable, and  th en  o ther variables to te s t o ther 
theories or issu es  concerning com pensation. U nfortunately, s tud ies  on 
b an k s do no t appear un til the  early to m iddle 1990s, by w hich tim e 
none explicitly include variables to tes t th e  sa le s /sa le s  growth 
m axim ization theory.
B anking stud ies focus on testing  the  pay-perform ance link, e. g. 
testing  the  p ro fit/shareho lder w ealth  m axim ization theory, in 
conjunction  w ith ano ther issue  of in terest, su c h  as de-regulation or 
en try  into investm ent banking. R esu lts of research  using  b a n k s  during  
th is  period are  mixed for the p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth  m axim ization
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theory. These re su lts  often differ solely on w hat variable is include in  
the  sta tistica l model, accoun ting-based  or m arket-based . N on-banking 
stud ies tend  to u se  m arke t-based  m easu res  of changes in  shareho lder 
w ealth  w ith g rea ter frequency as th e  decade passed . A ccounting-based 
variables are  u sed  less frequently  b u t  do n o t d isappear altogether. 
S tudies of non -banks generally su p p o rt the  p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth 
m axim ization theory.
In sum m ary, on th e  one hand , th e  m ore recen t s tu d ies  do u se  a  
m ore com plete definition of to ta l com pensation  and  th ree  s tud ies  for 
b an k s  do include larger d a ta  se ts, ranging from  74 to 97 banks. O n 
the  o ther hand , only the  p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth  m axim ization 
theory is tes ted  and  re su lts  are  still mixed, especially for the  few 
stud ies u sing  banks. Overall, fu rth e r research  is needed.
From  the analysis in  the  preceding parag raphs, the  first 
objective of the  cu rren t s tudy  is established . The first objective of th is  
s tudy  is to utilize the  two theories, p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth  
m axim ization and  sa le s /sa le s  grow th m axim ization, to explain to tal 
CEO com pensation in  th e  bank ing  industry . This objective is relevant 
because: 1. there  is a  paucity  of bank ing  stud ies on com pensation, 2. 
the  recen t bank ing  s tud ies  only include one of the  com pensation  
theories, 3. it is time to revisit th e  sa le s /sa le s  growth m axim ization 
theory, w hich ju s t  d isappears from the  com pensation lite ra tu re  in the  
early 1990s, 4. previous s tud ies  yield mixed re su lts  over all periods of
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tim e for bo th  non -banks an d  ban k s, and  5. con tinued  deregulation of 
the  banking  in d u stry  is often said  to m ake b a n k s  look m ore like n o n ­
banks. Will re su lts  of th is  study  for banks look sim ilar to non -bank  
research?
To satisfy the  first objective an d  address th e  relevant issues, the  
first hypothesis to be tes ted  is:
H l0: N either the  p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth  m axim ization theory  
no r the  sales /s a le s  grow th m axim ization theory  explains 
b a n k  CEO to ta l com pensation.
More th a n  one m odel specification is u se d  to te s t hypothesis 
one. More details on th ese  m odels are included in th e  nex t m ajor 
section of th is  chapter.
B ecause each of th e  two com pensation theories m ay only explain 
a  portion of to tal com pensation, the  second objective of the  cu rren t 
study  is to analyze th e  two theories in  relation  to individual 
com ponents or su b se ts  of com ponents of com pensation . The m ajor 
com ponents of total com pensation  are  base  salary , bonus, o ther cash  
com pensation, non-cash  com pensation  and  value of options granted. 
Previous research  defines to tal com pensation in  m any  different ways; 
however, fu rth er analysis of the  various com ponents of com pensation  
is generally om itted. Beyond ju s t  looking a t to ta l com pensation  in  the  
banking  stud ies, Vafeas, W aegelein an d  Papam ichael (2003) separately
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investigate the  value of all stock  options held  an d  Harjoto and  
M ullineaux (2003) look a t th e  value of stock and  option gran ts.
Objective two of th is  study  is also im portan t to firm owners, 
boards of directors, and  especially com pensation  com m ittees to help 
them  s tru c tu re  be tter pay packages th a t will m otivate an d  guide 
executive effort. Hopefully, th is  cu rre n t research  will offer insigh t into 
w hich variables to link to m anagerial effort an d  guidance for the  
design of the  nex t com pensation  package for b o th  to tal com pensation  
and  each com ponent of com pensation. To fulfill objective two, the  
following hypotheses are tested .
H20: N either the  p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth  m axim ization theory 
no r the  sa le s /sa le s  growth m axim ization theory explains 
b a n k  CEO a n n u a l cash  com pensation.
H30: N either the  p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth  m axim ization theory 
no r the  sa le s /sa le s  growth m axim ization theory explains 
b a n k  CEO stock  option (non-cash) com pensation.
Again, m ore th a n  one m odel specification is u sed  to tes t 
hypotheses two and  three. More details on th ese  m odels are  included 
in  the  next m ajor section of th is  chapter.
The th ird  objective of th is  s tu d y  is to significantly expand the 
nu m b er of com m ercial b an k s  being analyzed. Previous com pensation  
lite ra tu re  on b an k s typically include betw een 25 an d  97 of th e  largest
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banks. This s tu d y  significantly increases the  n u m b er of b a n k s  an d  
shou ld  greatly expand knowledge on com pensation  in the  bank ing  
industry . Obviously, th is  expansion  of the  d a ta  m ay also allow 
com parisons betw een m id-sized an d  the  very large banks, a s to 
differences in com pensation  s tru c tu re  an d  ability of the  two theories to 
explain com pensation.
Model Specification an d  Variable Selection 
The m ost parsim onious m odel to te s t th e  two com pensation  
theories is:
CEO com pensation  = f (profitability, sales).
In the  com pensation  litera tu re, the  overwhelm ing m ethod u sed  
to tes t th is  functional rela tionship  is som e type of least sq u ares  
regression. As m ore stud ies u sed  panel d a ta  and  econom etric 
techniques evolved, the  move is from  sim ple ord inary  least sq u ares to 
various generalized least sq u ares  to today’s fixed effects an d  random  
effects models. Some researchers, J e n se n  an d  M urphy (1990b), and  
Hall and  Liebm an (1998), m odel firm  specific tim e and  CEO effects 
sim ilar to a  random  effects m odel d iscussed  in  section four of th is  
chapter. Most researchers assu m e th a t tim e tren d s and  pay- 
perform ance relations are  co n stan t across executives. If so, an n u a l 
perform ance rela ted  changes in to ta l com pensation  are m odeled as:
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(CEO Pay)= a  + jSj (profitability) + jS2(sales) + £u 
w here a  is th e  m ean  of CEO pay no t a ttribu tab le  to o ther variables, 
an d  jSi and  J$2 are  e ither perform ance sensitiv ities or elasticities. 
Independent variables, profitability and  sales, are  vectors of 
contem poraneous and  lagged-profit or sales m easu res . This study  will 
estim ate th is  specification using  fixed effects m ethods.
This m odel specification m ay no t be adequa te  to yield u nb iased  
estim ators. As d iscussed  in  the  lite ra tu re  review, control variables 
beyond the  basic  two theories of com pensation  m ay be needed. For 
example, as resea rch  progressed, m any  stud ies include a  “size effect” 
control variable su c h  a s  to ta l a sse ts  or the  log of sales. T hus, a  m ore 
complete m odel specification m ight be:
CEO C om pensation = f (profitability, sales, control variables). 
This study  seeks to determ ine a  preferred specification th a t  explains 
b an k  CEO com pensation.
The dependan t variable, CEO com pensation, will be total 
com pensation or one of its  com ponents. Again, th e  com ponents of to tal 
CEO com pensation are base  salary, bonus, o th er cash  com pensation, 
non-cash  com pensation, and  value of options g ran ted  or som e 
com bination of these. In choosing the  independen t variables, a  
com m on problem  in  th is  and  previous resea rch  is w hat is an  
appropriate  proxy for perform ance. From  previous research , for the  
profit-m axim ization theory, perform ance m easu res  are either
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accounting-based  or m arket-based , m easu red  as absolu tes, first 
differences, or o ther transform ations.
Typical accounting  m easu res  are  re tu rn  on asse ts , re tu rn  on 
equity, n e t incom e, etc. In an  a ttem p t to reduce  possible confounding 
and  collinearity, H irschey and  P appas (1981) an d  Carroll an d  Ciscel 
(1982) u se  ‘residual profit’ or ne t profits no t a ttrib u tab le  to sales. Later 
stud ies po in t ou t that, due  to the  extrem ely low correlation betw een 
sales and  re tu rn  on asse ts , ne t incom e (profit) shou ld  be avoided an d  
re tu rn  on a sse ts  should  be used  a s  th e  profit m easure . M arket-based 
profitability, or shareho lder re tu rn  m easu res, com m only u sed  are to ta l 
an n u al stock  re tu rn , to ta l/ch an g es  in  shareho lder w ealth, or value of 
all stock or options cu rren tly  held by th e  CEO.
W hether the  accounting-based  variable or the  stock-based  
variable is a  m ore appropria te  proxy for perform ance is still a  
controversial issue. Some papers, like Crawford, Ezzell, and  Miles 
(1993), H ouston  and  Ja m es  (1993), M urphy (1985), and  Je n se n  an d  
M urphy (1990), u se  stock  re tu rn  a s  the  proxy for perform ance saying 
th a t  it is superio r to accounting b ased  proxies for perform ance. These 
stud ies have m ixed resu lts  linking CEO w ealth  changes to stock  
re tu rn s. However, there  is also a  significant am o u n t of research  
docum enting the  extensive and  successfu l u se  of accounting earn ings 
as a  basis  for CEO com pensation. Sloan (1993), Paul (1992), and  
Lam bert an d  Larcker (1987) argue th a t because  stock re tu rn s  are
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heavily influenced by the  overall economy, they  reflect lots of 
system atic risk  in stead  of a  firm ’s individual perform ance. The m ajor 
p a rt of th e  stock ’s m ovem ent is beyond the  CEOs’ control. T hus, it is 
uncerta in  how m any m anagerial con trac ts are  based  on  m arke t 
perform ance ra th e r  th a n  accounting  perform ance. Barro an d  Barro 
(1990) propose th a t accounting  re tu rn s  m ight provide independen t 
inform ation regarding CEO perform ance not con tained  in  the  re tu rn  to 
shareho lders an d  a sse rt th a t bo th  m easu res of perform ance m ight 
affect changes in com pensation. If collinearity is not a n  issue, I will 
follow Barro an d  Barro and  include bo th  m arke t-based  m easu res  and  
accounting-based  m easu res  as perform ance proxies. I do no t expect 
collinearity to be a  problem  because  the  correlation betw een re tu rn  on 
asse ts  and  shareho lder re tu rn  is low (r = .12).
W hen testing  the  S a les /S a les  growth m axim ization theory, 
previous research  prim arily u se s  dollars of sales, an  abso lu te  m easu re  
as described in the  original B aum ol (1959, 1967) theory. T his study  
also includes an n u a l sales grow th from B aum ol’s revised (1962) 
theory. If a  size effects proxy is used , prior research  typically u se s  to tal 
a sse ts  or a  log transfo rm ation  of to ta l a sse ts . Some researchers, 
Vafeas, W aegelein and  Papam ichael (2003) successfully  u se  sales to 
su b s titu te  for total asse ts. In th is  s tu d y  sales can  easily su b s titu te  due 
to its 0 .97 correlation to to ta l asse ts . For th is  study, the  inclusion  of
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sales accom plishes bo th  size effects control an d  a te s t of the  sales 
m axim ization theory.
There is often the  issue  th a t  a  p a rticu la r variable is no t equally 
representative across th e  entire d a ta  sam ple. For exam ple, in any  
banking study, w hat sh o u ld /co u ld  rep resen t “sa les”? Should  it be 
in te rest incom e or non -in te rest incom e, etc.? In th is  s tu d y  the  m ost 
com prehensive m easu re  of revenue w ould best reflect the  efforts of the  
CEO, who is responsible for all operations of the  bank . The m ost 
complete m easu re  of sa les available for banks, in  the  S tan d ard  and  
Poor’s R esearch Insight d a tabase  an d  is defined as “to ta l cu rren t 
operating revenue and  n e t p re-tax  profit or loss on securities sold or 
redeem ed” an d  th is  is th e  sales m easu re  used  in  th is  study.
The next question  is, will th is  definition of sa les suffice for 
testing  B aum ol’s sa le s /sa le s  grow th m axim ization theory? Yes. 
Baum ol (1959) a sse rts  th a t  CEO com pensation  is closely tied to the  
scale of operations. For scale, he suggested th e  u se  of to ta l revenue or 
sales, to tal asse ts , or a n n u a l changes in  those m easu res. In 1962, he 
fu rther suggests th a t a n n u a l growth of sales m ight be superio r to an  
absolu te  m easu re  of sa les revenue. Sales, as defined by S tan d a rd  and  
Poor’s, fits B aum ol’s descrip tions very well.
This research  also utilizes lagged explanatory or independen t 
variables. The idea th a t CEO com pensation  m ight be re la ted  to p a s t 
firm perform ance is often d iscussed  in  pub lished  litera ture, though
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rarely  tested. T his is su rp rising  considering th a t  base  pay, a t least to 
som e extent, shou ld  be re la ted  to p a s t perform ance Barro an d  Barro 
(1990). Some o ther s tud ies  also u se  lagged variables. McGuire, Chiu, 
an d  Elbing (1962) s ta te  th a t  the  one-period lag of Sales is significant, 
even if the  CEO is replaced. Tripp an d  Kenny (1995) find th a t  the  only 
significant variable to explain to tal com pensation  is the  one-period lag 
of shareho lder re tu rn . Sigler and  Porterfield (2001) include change in 
sa les as a size control variable; although, they are  actually  testing  the  
sales m axim ization theoiy.
This s tu d y  prim arily u ses  re tu rn  on average a sse ts  (ROAA), one 
year total re tu rn  to shareho lders (Return) and  n e t sa les (Sales). Lagged 
versions are also included. These p a rticu la r variab les dem onstra te  in 
p a s t s tud ies to be th e  m ost successfu l in  explaining CEO 
com pensation in  bo th  no n -b an k  and  bank ing  stud ies .
The m odel specifications and  variab les to te s t the  
aforem entioned hypotheses in section one are  a s  follows. To tes t 
hypothesis one, the  first or base  m odel is a  very sim ple, th ree  variable 
m odel th a t includes explanato iy  variables (ROAA, R etu rn  and  Sales) to 
te s t both  the  p ro fit/shareho lder w ealth  m axim ization theory and  the  
sa le s /sa le s  growth m axim ization theoiy. This basic  model is like the 
m ajority of the  litera tu re  w ith to tal com pensation  as the  dependent 
variable and  contem poraneous explanatory variables. The second 
m odel specification, and  all fu rther m odels in  th is  research , include
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six explanatory variables by adding  lagged variables, first differences, 
or annual growth ra te  variables. B oth of these  specifications te s t 
hypothesis one using  th e  entire d a ta  set.
Model th ree  in  th is  study  te s ts  hypothesis one using  only the  
372 sm aller banks. This allows for a  com parison of re su lts  to previous 
stud ies and  a  direct com parison to th e  large b a n k s  in  m y sam ple. To 
b e s t com pare th is  s tu d y ’s finding to previous research , a  su b se t of 
only the 78 largest b an k s  (typical of prior research) are analyzed in  the  
fourth  model. H ypotheses two an d  three, th a t te s t com ponents of to ta l 
com pensation, both  utilize m odels including th e  entire d a ta  se t an d  
the  large b a n k s  subset.
D ata
This study  will rely on two d a ta  sources, SNL F inancial L.P. an d  
S tandard  an d  Poor’s R esearch Insigh t (C om pustat N orth America). 
B ank  CEO C om pensation data , from  SNL Financial, is b roken  down 
into its com ponent p a rts  of b ase  salary, bonus, o ther cash  
com pensation, non -cash  com pensation  and  value of options granted . 
O ther option d a ta  available includes value of options exercised an d  
value of options held, bo th  exercisable and  un-exercisable. Definitions 
of com pensation variables u sed  in  th is  s tu d y  are available in Table 
3.1. O ther firm-specific and  accounting  d a ta  available from SNL
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Financial includes n u m b er of employees, n u m b er of b ranches, n e t 
in terest m argin, an d  various peer-perform ance m easures.
Table 3.1. C om pensation V ariable D efinitions
Variable Definition
Base salary C ash  salary, includes any com pensation  earned 
b u t deferred a t th e  officer’s election.
Bonus C ash  bonuses, includes any  com pensation  earned 
b u t deferred a t th e  officer’s  election.
O ther cash O ther cash  com pensation  including 401(k)’s, cash  
incentive plans, em ploym ent agreem ents, change in 
control agreem ents, profit sharing , etc.
A nnual cash** The a n n u a l cash-equivalent com pensation  paid to 
th e  executive. It consists of base  sa lary  p lu s bonus 
p lu s o ther cash  com pensation.
Non-cash Includes restric ted  stock, Employee stock  option 
p lans, etc.
Options** V alue of options aw arded: Exercise price tim es 
options g ranted  divided by three. This comm only 
u sed  approxim ation of the  B lack-Scholes model 
estim ates the  p resen t value of the  options and  
allows com parability across com panies. Awards are 
generally granted  w ith strike  price equal to stock 
price on day of th e  grant.
Total** The su m  of A nnual cash  p lu s O ptions.
Note: ** denotes dependent variables used in statistical models.
D ata from R esearch Insight include various m arke t-based  and  
accounting-based  perform ance m easu res  identified in  the  preceding 
section. R eturn  on average asse ts , one year shareho lder re tu rn , sales, 
and  one year change in sales are  the  prim ary explanatory  or
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independent variab les u sed  in  the  s ta tis tica l m odels. Definitions of the  
explanatory variables u sed  in  th is  s tu d y  are con ta ined  in  Table 3.2.
Table 3.2. E xplanatory  Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
TA Total a sse ts  in  m illions of dollars a t  fiscal year end.
ROAA R eturn  on average asse ts . Net incom e before ex tra ­
ordinary  item s divided by average a sse ts  tim es 100.
ROAAL One period lag of ROAA. 
(ROAAt-i)
R eturn A nnualized percentage to ta l re tu rn  to comm on 
shareholders. Includes price apprecia tion  an d  dividend 
reinvestm ent.
Retum L One period lag of R eturn. 
(R etum ti)
Sales Includes to tal operating revenue an d  net pretax  profits 
or loss on securities sold or redeem ed.
chgSales C urren t sales m inus previous period’s sales. 
(Salest -  Salest-i)
groSales A nnual percentage grow th in  sales. 
((Salest -  Salest-i)/Salest-i ) x  100
NIM Net In terest Margin: n e t in te res t incom e, fully taxable, 
a s  a percentage of average earn ing  asse ts.
The period u n d er study  is 1998 th ro u g h  2004. Due to various 
lagged an d  growth variables, financial d a ta  on com m ercial b a n k s  and  
b a n k  holding com panies across n ine years (1996-2004) is required  for 
th is  study. Analyzing bo th  d a ta  sources, inform ation is available on 
484  b an k s in  2004. D ue to m issing  d a ta  on som e m arke t-based
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variables an d  com ponents of com pensation  in  earlier years, the  final 
sam ple includes 450 com m ercial b a n k s  and  b a n k  holding com panies. 
This num ber is alm ost five tim es th a t  of any  previous stu d y  of banks. 
The m ajority of banks, 372, range in  a sse t size (2004) betw een 400  
million an d  8 billion dollars. The nex t 57 b a n k s  range betw een 8-50 
billion dollars, w ith the largest 21 b a n k s  ranging betw een 50 billion to 
1.45 trillion dollars. D ue to the  skew ed n a tu re  of the  b a n k  sizes, 
appropriate  m easu res  are taken  to reduce  b ias in  the  final analysis.
S ta tistica l Methodology 
There are  several p rocedures available for the  estim ation  of 
pooled, tim e-series, cross-sectional or panel da ta . Choice is dependen t 
upon  assum ptions m ade abou t the  in terrelationsh ip  of the  exogenous 
variables, bo th  cross-sectionally  an d  across time, assu m p tio n s 
regarding th e  error term(s), and  or the  researcher’s desire for either 
less b ias or g reater efficiency in the  estim ators. Two basic  techn iques 
commonly u sed  are the  one-way fixed effects model, or w ith in-cases 
estim ator, and  the  one-way random  effects, or error com ponents 
model, w hich is a  w ithin an d  betw een cases estim ator. The one-way 
effects m odel assum es the  specification is dependen t only on the  
cross-sections to w hich the  observations belong. There are  also m ore 
sophisticated  two-way effects m odels, w hich assu m e th a t  bo th  the  
cross section and  the  tim e series to w hich an  observation belongs are
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im portant. There are  also special autoregressive and  m ixed-variance 
com ponent m odels available, u sing  special econom etric tim e-series 
techniques, if needed. To date, previous research  em ploys a  one-way 
random  effects m odel u sin g  generalized least sq u a res  techniques.
The fixed effects regression specification or the  w ith in-cases 
estim ator includes tim e-variant independen t variables an d  unobserved 
effects (beyond random  error) th a t  m ay be correlated w ith the 
independent variables. The fixed effects m odel equation  is: 
y i t  = lit + fixa + a i  + Sit (3.1)
w here i=  l,..,n ; t = l , . . , T
In equation  (3.1), pit is an  in tercep t th a t is allowed to vary w ith 
time, jS is a  row vector of fixed p aram eter coefficients, Xu are the  
predictor variab les (strictly exogenous), an d  ett is th e  random  
d istu rbance  term . The a* rep resen ts  all differences betw een 
p e rso n s /c a se s  th a t are stable, (fixed param eters , one per person) over 
tim e and  m ay or m ay no t be correlated w ith xtt. In th is  study, it is 
possible th a t  unobserved individual effects, a; , su ch  a s  the  innate  
ability of CEO’s, m ay be correlated w ith specific independen t variables, 
su ch  as firm  perform ance m easu res. These unm easu red , stable 
charac teristics m ay be estim ated  directly or conditioned ou t of the  
estim ation process, hence the  nam e, “fixed effects.” Fixed effects 
m ethods completely ignore the  betw een-person variation  an d  focus 
only on the  w ith in-person variation. D iscarding the betw een-person
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variation can  yield s ta n d a rd  erro rs th a t  are considerably  h igher th a n  
those produced by m ethods th a t utilize bo th  w ithin- an d  betw een- 
person  variation. A researcher w ould use  fixed effects m ethods and  
ignore betw een-person variation  because  the  betw een-person  variation 
is likely to be con tam inated  by u n m easu red  personal charac teristics 
th a t are correlated w ith com pensation. By restric ting  ourselves to 
w ith in-person variation, we elim inate th a t con tam ination . T hus, while 
fixed effects m odels will generally have m ore sam pling variability (less 
efficiency) they  are far m ore likely to be un b iased  an d  consisten t. 
Given the  typical expectation of b ias in  non-experim ental or 
observational stud ies, th is  trade-off for reduced  b ias is very appealing.
There is an  im portan t dow nside to th e  fixed effects m ethods. 
Only variables th a t  have w ith in-person  varia tion  will yield coefficients. 
T hus, tim e-invarian t variables, su c h  a s  gender or race, could no t be 
included. This could be a  critical lim itation if a  dum m y variable is 
needed for the  skewed n a tu re  of a sse t size of th e  sam ple banks. Fixed 
effect m odels are also generally less restrictive th a n  th e ir alternative, 
the  random  effects m odels. The random  effects m odel can  be looked a t 
as a special case of the  fixed effects model, one th a t requ ires far m ore 
assum ptions. The basic random  effects m odel is as follows:
\jit = pit + fixn + yzt + a; + £it (3.2)
w here i= l,..,n ; t=  1 ,..,T
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As in  the  previous model, pit is an  in te rcep t th a t is allowed to 
vary w ith tim e, j8 is a  row vector of fixed p aram eter coefficients, xa are  
the  predictor variables (strictly exogenous), an d  su is th e  random  
d istu rbance  term . Now, however, in stead  of assum ing  th a t at 
rep resen ts a  se t of fixed param eters , we assu m e each at is a  random  
variable w ith a  specified probability  d istribu tion . The typical 
assum ption  is th a t at h a s  a norm al d istribu tion  w ith a  m ean  of zero 
and  co n stan t variance, and  th a t it is independen t (uncorrelated) w ith 
Xit, Zi, and  s u  . In th is  equation, y  is a  row vector of coefficients an d  Zi 
are the  tim e-invarian t variables.
The p rim aiy  difference betw een fixed effects and  random  effects 
estim ates is th a t the  random  effects m odel does n o t control for 
betw een-person variation. This is because  a  key assum ption  of the  
random  effects m ethod is th a t th e  at are uncorre la ted  w ith Xu. The 
fixed effects model, on the  o ther h an d , im poses no restric tions on the  
relationship  betw een a* an d  xu.
So, why use  a  random  effects model? First, the  random  effects 
m ethod can  produce coefficient estim ates for tim e-invarian t variables. 
Remember, fixed effects m ethods control for these  tim e-invarian t 
predictors: it ju s t  does no t produce coefficient estim ates for them . 
Also, unlike random  effects m odels, the  fixed effects m odels control for 
all tim e-invariant variables, no t ju s t  those include in the  regression 
model. A second attractive feature  of the  random  effects m odel is the
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ability to in troduce random  coefficients for the  tim e-varying predictors. 
The model from equation  (3.2) can  be rew ritten  as:
yu = pit + fiiXit + yz; + ai + su (3.3)
w here i=  l ,....,n ; t = l , . . . . , T
E quation  (3.3) sim ply p u ts  a n  i su b sc rip t on th e  j8 coefficient, 
w hich rep resen ts  these  random  coefficients for th e  tim e-varying 
predictors. A th ird  advantage of random  effects m ethods is the  ability 
to allow for autoregressive and  o ther covariance s tru c tu re s  on the  Sit 
com ponent, if needed. In sum m ary, the  random  effect m odel calculates 
bo th  w ithin and  betw een variability w hich re su lts  in  m ore efficient 
estim ators, bu t, if assu m p tio n s are  no t m et, can  easily lead to b iased  
estim ators. Fixed effect m odels are  often favored due  to their less 
restrictive n a tu re  and  un b iased  estim ators, of key im portance in non- 
experim ental or observational stud ies. Random  effects m odels are  
necessary  if coefficient estim ates are  needed for tim e-invarian t 
variables an d  they allow for autoregressive and  o th er covariance 
s tru c tu re s  on the  erro r term  (ea). A nother consideration  is w hich 
m odels can  handle  unbalanced  d a ta  or m issing data , if a t all? Both the  
fixed-effects and  random -effects m odels in  SAS (PROC GLM and  PROC 
MIXED, respectively) can  hand le  unbalanced  designs w hich generally 
produce b e tte r re su lts  th a n  excluding observations to create a 
balanced panel (Batalgi and  Chang, 1994). The fixed effects m odel is 
expected to be the appropria te  m ethod for th is  study  given it is less
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
54
prone to b ias and  no tim e-invarian t variables are  being used . There is 
a  sta tistica l te s t available in  SAS using  the  TSCSREG procedure th a t  
te s ts  the nu ll hypothesis of the  random  effects m odel aga in st the  fixed 
effects model. This is  the  H au sm an  tes t (1981), available in SAS ETS 
using  PROC TSCSREG, an o th er panel d a ta  m ethod, u sed  prim arily for 
balanced  design. This H ausm an  te s t allows th e  d a ta  to d ictate w hich 
m ethod is th e  appropria te  one. The SAS TSCSREG also h a s  the  g rea ter 
flexibility to te s t an d  a d ju s t for autoregressive and  o ther problem s, if 
they exist.
S um m ary
This chap ter provided the  theoretical justification  for th is  s tu d y  
and  its related  hypotheses. Additionally, th is  ch ap ter provided the  
m odel specification, d a ta  sources, variables an d  definitions, and  th e  
sta tistica l methodology to be u sed  in  testing  the  hypotheses. The 
resu lts  of th is  s tudy  are d iscussed  in the  next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This chap ter p resen ts  th ree  m ain  sections. F irst, a  detailed 
descrip tion of the sam ple is provided. Second, the  re su lts  of s ta tistica l 
te s ts  of hypotheses are  provided. Finally, th e  ch ap ter concludes w ith a  
brief sum m ary.
Sam ple
The final d a ta  se t consists of 450 b a n k s  w ith  to tal a sse ts  
ranging betw een $500 million an d  $1.45 billion, in 2004. Seven years 
of a n n u a l d a ta  are  used , spann ing  the  years 1998 th rough  2004. Due 
to m issing d a ta  in  earlier years or new  s ta r tu p  ban k s, individual 
b an k s have betw een th ree  and  seven years of u sab le  da ta . Overall, if a  
one-year lagged variable is analyzed, the  average b a n k  h as 5 .97 
observation years. This section con tinues by providing descriptive 
sum m ary  sta tis tics on variables u sed  in  th is  s tu d y  and  a detailed 
breakdow n of total com pensation  into its com ponent parts .
55
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
56
Descriptive S tatistics
The time sp a n  of th is  s tu d y  encom passes periods of strong, 
w eak and  s tag n an t econom ic environm ents. Also du ring  th is  period, 
several ‘shocks’ to th e  econom y an d  banking  environm ent occurs w ith 
the Long Term  C apital M anagem ent, Enron, an d  W orldCom scandals, 
the  te rro rist a ttack  of Septem ber 2001, an d  the  w ar in  Iraq in  the  
spring of 2003. These events could resu lt in  m ore d ram atic  m ovem ent 
in explanatory variable values in  bo th  m agn itude  an d  direction, th u s  
yielding a  “richer” d a ta  set. These big events effect th e  “mood of the  
coun try ,” changing consum er confidence an d  expectations, resu lting  
in faster response an d  larger sw ings in the  economy. C om pensation 
packages should  also change m ore frequently  in  response  to the  
changing environm ent, increasing  the  probability of finding linkages 
betw een them  and  the  explanatory  variables, if they exist. The ability 
to find these  linkages will determ ine if the  p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth  
m axim ization theory  a n d /o r  th e  sales /s a le s  grow th m axim ization 
theory explains b a n k  CEO com pensation. D escriptive s ta tis tics  for the  
entire  d a ta  se t of 450 b an k s over seven years are  found in  Table 4.1.
As show n by the  resu lts  reported  in  Table 4.1, th e  m inim um  an d  
m axim um  values indicate the  v ast diversity of the  b a n k s  on pay, size 
and  perform ance. While the  m axim um  values in  the  u p p er panel are  
e ither C itibank or B ank  of America, all o ther d a ta  values are  from
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Table 4.1. Descriptive Aggregate S um m ary  S ta tistics 
All B anks: 1998-2004
Variable N M ean M inim um M axim um
A nnual Pay 3012 687680.000 32500.000 19933818.000
Option Pay 2905 473312.000 0.000 36267345 .000
Total Pay 3012 1144178.000 68173.000 45021119 .000
Sales 2998 1029.000 1.591.000 112022.000
chgSales 2835 95.000 -19993.000 38882.000
Total A ssets 3006 13139.000 46.000 1484101.000
ROAA 2990 1.108 -6.412 5.678
R eturn 2999 16.559 -73.707 281.941
groSales 2834 13.780 -69.089 6013.190
A nnual/TA 2932 364.142 4.110 7023.620
Option/TA 2851 77.693 0.000 3088.560
Total/TA 2932 439.689 5.666 7023.620
Note: Sales and Total A ssets in millions of dollars. ROAA, Return and groSALES are 
in %. Pay variables are in $ or $ per million of total assets
m any various b an k s. M ean values in  th e  u p p er panel are  heavily 
influenced by the  larger b an k s  due  to the  skew ed n a tu re  of b an k  size 
as depicted in  Figure 4.1. Lower panel m ean s are dom inated  by the  
sm aller b a n k s  in  the  study.
<D
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Figure 4.1. Plot of B ank  Total A ssets Sorted by Size
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While Table 4.1 includes th e  sam ple m eans u sed  in  hypo thesis 
tests , investigation of m eans for individual years yields in te resting  
resu lts . A nnual C ash  C om pensation is the  only variable to increase  
eveiy year of the  study. Total A ssets, increase  six of seven years. All 
o ther variables have mixed resu lts , increasing  in  th ree  or four years  
and  declining or rem aining flat in  o ther years as they respond  to th e  
changing economic environm ent. Interestingly, the  variable va lues do 
no t move up  or down in  un ison . For example, in  only two years do the  
perform ance variables, ROAA an d  shareho lder R eturns, change in  th e  
sam e direction. M ean Option com pensation  declines enough during  
th ree  years, offsetting gains in  A nnual C ash  C om pensation, su ch  th a t  
to tal com pensation falls in two years  and  rem ains flat in  the  th ird . The 
w orst year for b a n k  perform ance and  growth is 1999; also the  b e s t 
year for growth of CEO com pensation.
As previously d iscussed  in  C hap ters 2 and  3, prior b a n k  
com pensation s tu d ies  u se  m uch  sm aller d a ta  se ts  as com pared to th is  
research. S tud ies by Harjoto an d  M ullineaux (2003) and  Vafeas, 
W aegelein and  Papam ichael (2003) utilize 74 an d  94 b a n k s  
respectively. To allow for d irect com parisons betw een th is  resea rch  
and  earlier work, a  su b se t of m y 78 largest b an k s is analyzed. Also, 
referring to the  to ta l a sse t plot in Figure 4.1, there  could be a 
system atic difference betw een th e  largest 78 b an k s  an d  the  rem aining  
372 sm aller b an k s  th a t could affect com pensation theory  hypothesis
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tests . Descriptive sta tis tic s  for these  78 largest b a n k s  are  sum m arized  
in Table 4.2.
The m ost in teresting  re su lts  are  w hen Table 4 .2  m ean  values are 
com pared to those  of Table 4.1. The large b an k s are  far more efficient 
in a sse t utilization by generating a m ean  R eturn  on Average A ssets 
(ROAA) of 1.276% as  com pared to 1.108% for all b a n k s  (and 1.073% 
for sm all banks). Yet, in  m ean  re tu rn  to shareho lders, the sm aller 
b an k s  achieve h igher re tu rn s . C om paring resu lts  for A nnual Pay 
divided by Total A ssets
Table 4.2. Descriptive Aggregate Sum m ary S ta tistics 
Large B anks: 1998-2004
Variable N M ean M inim um M aximum
A nnual Pay 542 1898427.000 326900.000 19933818.000
Option Pay 526 2025662 .000 0.000 36267345.000
Total Pay 542 3864291 .000 336663.000 45021119 .000
Sales 546 5214.000 136.831 112022.000
chgSales 544 467.000 -19993.000 38882.000
Total A ssets 546 66122.000 1465.000 1484101.000
ROAA 546 1.275 -6.412 3.605
R eturn 544 15.334 -69.899 281.941
groSales 544 12.815 -69.089 418 .388
A nnual/TA 542 99.103 4.110 991.769
Option/TA 526 73.310 0.000 1085.500
Total/TA 542 170.249 5.666 1338.870
Note: Sales and Total A ssets in millions of dollars. ROAA, Return and groSALES are 
in %. Pay variables are in $ or $ per million of total assets
(Annual/TA), large b an k  CEO’s receive an  average of $99 .10  per 
million dollars of a sse ts  as opposed to an  average of $364.14  for the  
entire d a ta  set. Com paring resu lts  for Option pay divided by Total
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A ssets (Option/TA), large b an k  CEO’s receive a n  average of $73.31 per 
million dollars of a sse ts  as opposed to an  average of $77 .69  for th e  
entire  d a ta  set. These resu lts  w ould indicate th a t A nnual Pay is a  
decreasing function of b a n k  size, while Option pay  is v irtually  
identical. These pay resu lts  could indicate  th a t my two theo ries’ ability 
to explain CEO com pensation  m ight be different for big b a n k s  
com pared to sm aller banks.
C om ponent C om pensation by Year
C om ponent com pensation  by year is analyzed to a sse ss  the 
m agnitude or dom inance of any category of com pensation, and  to 
identify any  trends in  the  various com ponents of com pensation. The 
breakdow n of com ponents of CEO pay by year is sum m arized  in Table 
4.3. The cash  com ponents of com pensation  (Annual Pay) are Base, 
B onus an d  m ost of O ther (as defined in  th is  table). N on-cash 
com pensation  is prim arily rep resen ted  by restric ted  stock.
Table 4.3. Aggregate C om ponents of CEO Pay a s  a 
Percentage of Total C om pensation
Year Base B onus N on-Cash Option O ther
2004 21.2 15.7 7.0 43.4 12.7
2003 28.3 23.2 10.6 30.3 7.6
2002 22.1 13.9 5.8 47.8 10.4
2001 22.1 14.8 6.2 49.6 7.3
2000 15.1 9.7 4.0 65.3 5.9
1999 17.5 11.2 8.9 55.7 6.7
1998 21.4 15.6 5.3 50.6 7.1
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From  the 1998 levels, all c ash  com ponents steadily  decline in
1999 and  2000 as a  per-cen t of to tal com pensation, while option 
com pensation  grows dram atically . The overall cash  to n on -cash  
rew ards move from 44% /54%  to a  dram atic  30% /70%  split. A 
s tru c tu ra l shift in  pay  packages seem s to occur w hen m oving from
2000 to 2001. Base an d  b o n u s com ponents increase  th e ir sh a re  of 
to ta l com pensation in  2001 an d  rem ain  a  relatively stab le  proportion  
over the final four years. The level of o ther pay  also increases in 2001 
and  continues to grow to a  larger com ponent proportion  of to ta l 
com pensation. The level of option pay drops in  2001 a n d  con tinues to 
decline a s  a proportion of to tal pay. By the  end of th e  period u n d e r 
study, 2004, cash  to n on -cash  pay  is an  even 50% /50%  split. This 
decline in  option pay seem s u n u su a l for two reasons. First, Je n se n  
and  M urphy (1990a an d  1990b), Harjoto an d  M ullineaux (2003) and  
o ther stud ies claim  th a t, over time, pay-perform ance sensitivities, a s  
m easured  by shareho lder re tu rn , a re  steadily increasing, resu lting  in  
substan tia lly  larger CEO option com pensation. Second, given how 
option com pensation aw ards are  valued, all else being equal, the  
su b s tan tia l growth in  stock  prices of b an k s over the  la s t four years 
shou ld  resu lt in option pay being an  even larger com ponent of to ta l 
com pensation, or a t least show  a n  increase in  dollar value aw arded. 
B ecause the  dollar value of options aw arded rem ains flat from 2001- 
2004, the  m ost p lausible  explanation  is th a t  fewer sh a re s  are  aw arded,
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on average, each year. This could indicate  a  s tru c tu ra l shift in  
com pensation packages th a t requ ires fu rth er investigation w hen m ore 
d a ta  is available.
C om ponent C om pensation 
by A sset Size
The breakdow n of com ponent com pensation  by a sse t size is 
analyzed to a sse ss  possible differences betw een larger an d  sm aller 
banks. This breakdow n of com ponents of CEO pay by asse t size for 
selected years is sum m arized  in  Table 4.4. B ase pay is the  dom inant 
com ponent for sm aller banks, averaging 55% of to tal com pensation. As 
b an k  size increases, b ase  pay falls rapidly a s  a  per-cen t of to tal pay. 
This is partly  due to the  Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 th a t  
places a one million dollar cap on the  tax  deductibility  of base  salaries, 
u n less these  sa laries are tied to perform ance. Base salary  in  my 
sam ple d a ta  exceeded one million dollars only five tim es in 3150 
observations.
Option com pensation  is the  dom inan t com ponent for larger 
banks, b u t  decreases in m agnitude over tim e sim ilar to resu lts  in 
Table 4.3. As b an k  size increases, option pay rises rapidly as a  p e r­
cent of to tal pay. Of in te rest is th a t  option com pensation  increases as 
a  proportion of to ta l pay for all b u t the  largest category of banks. It 
appears th a t the  sm aller th ree  categories of b a n k s  are shifting dollars 
from options to the  b o n u s and  o ther com ponents. The m any
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Table 4.4. Aggregate C om ponents of CEO Pay as a  Percentage of 
Total C om pensation, by A sset Size (selected years)
Year 
A sset Size Base B onus N on-Cash Option O ther
2004
<$500M 56.1 13.6 2.1 19.0 9.2
$500M to IB 44.2 14.0 5.3 23.0 13.5
$1B to $5B 32.4 16.7 5.6 34.1 11.2
>$5B 13.9 21.4 7.9 38.9 17.9
2001
<$500M 53.9 14.7 1.6 15.7 14.1
$500M  to IB 48.4 15.7 3.2 17.7 15.0
$1B to $5B 36.0 19.9 5.7 27.9 10.5
>$5B 13.0 18.7 9.7 52.7 5.9
1998
<$500M 55.3 15.6 2.1 16.1 10.9
$500M to IB 56.6 17.7 1.8 14.2 9.7
$1B to $5B 39.6 22.9 2.2 29.4 5.9
>$5B 9.9 14.3 6.8 62.3 6.7
differences on w here com pensation  is allocated depending on b a n k  
size lend fu rther su p p o rt th a t b a n k  size m ay change th e  outcom e of 
hypotheses tests.
R esults of S ta tistical T ests of H ypotheses 
This section provides the  re su lts  of s ta tis tica l te s ts  of 
hypotheses. Before m odel or variable significance can  be used  to te s t 
hypotheses, we m u st first check th a t each  m odel does not violate 
assum ptions, con tain  collinear explanatory  variables, influential 
outliers or any o ther irregularities. One com m on problem  in th is  type 
of study  is the violation of the  co n stan t variance assum ption , or 
heteroskedasticity , due  to the skew ed n a tu re  of the  d a ta  as depicted in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
64
Figure 4.1. Typically, there  is a n  increase  in  variation  for larger va lues 
of the response variable. O ne com m on rem edy is to u se  a 
transform ation  of th e  response  variable (Steel an d  Torie, 1980). 
However, to m ain ta in  a linear regression  rela tionsh ip  am ong variables, 
a  sim ultaneous transfo rm ation  of the  independen t variab les is also 
often needed. A nother remedy, th e  m ethod u sed  m ost in  the  litera ture, 
is the inclusion  of a  “size-effects” control variable am ong the  
explanatory variables. Total a sse ts  is the  m ost com m only u sed  size 
control variable; however, som e recen t s tud ies  have u se d  sales (Sigler 
& Porterfield, 2001). In th is  study , sa les are  included  in  all m odels to 
act as  bo th  the  size-effects control variable an d  as a  te s t  variable for 
Baum ol’s (1959) sa les m axim ization theory. B aum ol’s (1959) theory  is 
th a t scale effects (size-effects) is m ore highly correlated to 
com pensation th a n  is profits.
Each m odel specification shou ld  also be checked to see if a  
fixed-effects or random -effects m odel is appropria te . As previously 
d iscussed  in C hap ter 3, th is  s tu d y  should  u se  fixed effects p rocedures 
because no tim e invarian t variables are  used . Also, th e  fixed effects 
model is preferred due to its  less restrictive n a tu re  and  un b iased  
estim ators, of key im portance in  non-experim ental or observational 
studies.
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H ypothesis One R esults
H l 0: N either th e  p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth  m axim ization theory  
no r the  sa le s /sa le s  grow th m axim ization theory  explains 
b a n k  CEO total com pensation.
The first m odel to tes t hypothesis one is a  very basic  th ree  
explanatory variable model, typical of m any  earlier com pensation  
studies. The response  or dependen t variable is to tal CEO 
com pensation. To te s t the  p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth  m axim ization 
theory, the  explanatory  or independen t variables are  ROAA an d  
Return. To te s t th e  sa le s /sa le s  growth m axim ization theory, the  
explanatory or independen t variable is Sales.
The first step  is to determ ine if a  random  effects or a  fixed effects 
m odel is appropria te . The one-way random  effects m odel is estim ated  
first because  it autom atically  perform s the  H ausm an  te s t for random  
effects, a  m odel specification test. If th is  te s t is rejected, the  fixed 
effects m odel is the  appropriate  model. R esults show ed the  H ausm an  
te s t for random  effects to be strongly rejected (p-value < .0001). The 
fixed effects m odel also includes a  m odel specification te s t th a t checks 
for significant fixed effects am ong th is  m odel’s 450 (num ber of banks) 
cross-sectional regressions. This F tes t for no fixed effects is strongly 
rejected (p-value < .0001), fu rth er supporting  the  choice of the  fixed 
effects model. Residual plots indicate no violations of m odel 
assum ptions, b u t a  few outliers are p resen t. F u rth e r investigation
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revealed none of these  ou tliers are  influential; therefore, no 
observations are dropped. A few prio r s tu d ies  found ROAA and  R etu rn  
are often related, b u t  no evidence of collinearity is detected in  th is  
model. The resu lts  of the  basic  m odel u sing  the  fixed effects procedure  
are p resen ted  in  Table 4.5.
Table 4.5. E stim ates of Total C om pensation for B ank 
Chief Executive Officers: Model 1
Independent Base Model n  = 450
Variable Coefficient p-value
ROAA 293179 .00 .0001
R eturn 127.00 .8780
Sales 486 .00 .0001
Adj. R2 0.77
F-value 18.09 .0001
H ypothesis one is rejected due to th e  overall significance of the  
m odel (F-value = 18.09, p-value < .0001). Individual variable te s t 
resu lts  are  as follows. From  Table 4.5, ROAA exhibits a  significantly 
positive rela tionship  to the  response  variable, to ta l com pensation  
(coefficient = 293179, p-value = .0001). The coefficient is in terpreted  as 
follows: a  0.1% increase in re tu rn  on average a sse ts  resu lts  in  an  
increase of total CEO com pensation  of $29,318, on average, all o ther 
variables held constan t. Looking again  a t table 4.5, Sales also exhibits 
a  significantly positive rela tionsh ip  to to ta l com pensation  (coefficient = 
486, p-value < .0001). This coefficient is in terpreted  as, a $1 m illion 
increase in  sales resu lts  in  a n  increase  of to tal CEO com pensation  of
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$486, on average, all o ther variables held constan t. R etu rn  to 
shareho lders is positively related, b u t no t significantly related  to to ta l 
com pensation (p-value = .8780). In sum m ary, hypothesis one is 
rejected. The p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth  m axim ization theory  is 
supported  by th e  significance of ROAA. The sa les /s a le s  growth 
m axim ization theory  is suppo rted  by the  significance of Sales. O ther 
variables analyzed in  th is  m odel are n e t in te res t m argin , su b s titu ted  
for ROAA and  change in  sales, su b s titu ted  for sales. N either variable 
proved very usefu l here or in  la te r m odels. Net in te re s t m argin  is 
som etim es mildly significant in  “cash ” com pensation  m odels bu t, 
overall, ROAA proved superio r by consistently  indicating  stronger 
linkages to pay.
A second m odel to te s t hypothesis one expands on the  base  
m odel in  an  a ttem p t to gain  insigh t into w hat additional variables 
could be added to be tter explain CEO com pensation. V ariables u sed  
are grounded in  bo th  prior research  and  theory. M cGuire, Chiu, and  
Elbing (1962) reported  th a t som e one-period, lagged variables are  often 
b e tter th a n  contem poraneous variables an d  Tripp an d  Kenny (1995) 
successfully  u sed  the  lagged variable, R etum t i. To tes t B aum ol’s 
(1962) sales growth m axim ization theory, C oughlan and  Schm idt 
(1985) an d  o thers include th e  contem poraneous one-year growth of 
sales. This p resen t study  will now  add lagged variab les for re tu rn  on
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average asse ts, ROAAL, an d  one-year shareho lder re tu rn , Retum L, 
and  also add a n n u a l growth in  sales, groSales.
In th is  s tu d y ’s second model, a  full six variable specification is 
estim ated. To te s t th e  p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth  m axim ization theory, 
the  explanatory or independen t variables are ROAA, ROAAL, R eturn  
and  Retum L. To te s t  the  sa le s /sa le s  growth m axim ization theory, the  
explanatory or independen t variables are  Sales an d  groSales. The full 
m odel resu lts  show ed the  H au sm an  te s t for random  effects to be 
strongly rejected (p-value <.0001). This m odel specification F te s t for 
no fixed effects is strongly rejected (p-value < .0001). Residual plots 
indicate no significant violations of m odel assum p tions , b u t again  a 
few outliers are  p resen t. F u rth e r investigation revealed th a t none are 
influential; therefore, no observations are  dropped. Evidence of som e 
collinearity is detected in th is  model. The variance inflation factors 
(VIF) for ROAA an d  ROAAL are each abou t 1.96, w hich are well below 
the accepted cutoff of 10. Inspection of the  eigenvalue s truc tu re , 
condition index an d  sequential b e tas  indicate the  level of collinearity is 
a t a n  acceptable level. The re su lts  of the  full m odel using  the  fixed 
effects procedure are  p resen ted  in  Table 4.6.
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Table 4.6. E stim ates of Total C om pensation  for B ank  Chief
Executive Officers: Model 2
Independent Full Model n  = 450
Variable Coefficient p-value
ROAA 290052 .00 .0011
R eturn -24.00 .9795
Sales 477 .00 .0001
ROAAL 147443.00 .0850
R etum L 631.00 .4191
groSales -5142.00 .0002
Adj. R2 0 .78
F-value 16.85 .0001
H ypothesis one is rejected due to th e  overall significance of the  
m odel (F-value = 16.85, p-value < .0001). Individual variable te s t 
resu lts  are  as follows. From  Table 4 .6 , ROAA again  exhibits a 
significantly positive rela tionship  to the  response variable, to ta l 
com pensation (coefficient = 290052, p-value = .0011). Sales exhibits a 
significantly positive relationship  to to ta l com pensation  (coefficient = 
477, p-value < .0001). Two of the  th ree  new  variables con tribu te  to the  
model. The variable groSales h a s  a  significantly negative relationship  
to to tal com pensation  (coefficient = -5142, p-value = .0002). The 
variable ROAAL h a s  a  mildly significant positive rela tionship  to to ta l 
com pensation (coefficient = 147443, p-value = .0850). C urren t re tu rn  
to shareholders, R eturn, an d  las t year’s re tu rn  to shareholders, 
Retum L, are  no t related  to to ta l com pensation  (p-values = .9795 and  
.4191 respectively).
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In sum m ary , hypothesis one is rejected. The p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er 
w ealth  m axim ization theory is suppo rted  by the  significance of ROAA 
and  ROAAL. The sa le s /s a le s  grow th m axim ization theory  is supported  
by the significance of Sales. The negative coefficient, a lthough  
significant, for groSales is con trary  to theory  and  will be d iscussed  
fu rther in  the  next chapter. From  th is  point forward, only the  full, six 
variable m odels is used .
At th is  point, the  issue  of differences in  b an k  size -  Will b a n k  
size affect how well the  two theories explain CEO com pensation? -  
m u st be addressed . H ypothesis one is again  tested, b u t w ith two 
su b se ts  of the  sam ple data . The first m odel u se s  the  78 largest b a n k s  
(com parable to prior research), while the second m odel u se s  the  372 
sm aller banks. Once again, to te s t the  p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth  
m axim ization theory, the  explanatory  or independen t variab les are  
ROAA, ROAAL, R etu rn  and  Retum L. To te s t the  sa le s /sa le s  grow th 
m axim ization theory, the  explanatory  or independen t variables are  
Sales and groSales. The resu lts  for bo th  m odels show  the H au sm an  
tes t for random  effects to be rejected (p-value = .0266 an d  .0435 
respectively). This m odel specification F te s t for no fixed effects is 
strongly rejected (p-value < .0001) for bo th  models. R esidual p lo ts 
indicate no violations of m odel assum ptions, b u t again  a  few ou tliers 
are present. F u rth e r investigation revealed no outliers are influential; 
therefore, no observations are dropped. Evidence of som e collinearity
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is detected in  th ese  m odels. The variance inflation factors (VIF) for 
ROAA and  ROAAL each  are ab o u t 2.0, w hich are still well below th e  
accepted cutoff of 10. Inspection of the  eigenvalue s tru c tu re , condition 
index an d  sequen tia l be tas indicate  the  level of collinearity is w ith in  
acceptable levels. The resu lts  for th e  78 largest b a n k s  using  the  fixed 
effects procedure are  p resen ted  in  Table 4.7.
H ypothesis one is rejected due to the  overall significance of the  
model (F-value = 13.51, p-value < .0001). Individual variable te s t 
resu lts  are as follows. Inspection of co lum ns two an d  th ree  in  Table 
4.7 reveals re su lts  very different th a n  for th e  450-bank , full m odel in  
Table 4.6. R esults from Table 4 .7  for the  big b an k  m odel are: Sales 
exhibits a  significantly positive rela tionship  to to tal com pensation
Table 4.7. E stim ates of Total C om pensation for B ank  Chief 
Executive Officers: Model 3
Independent Large B anks n  = 78
Variable Coefficient p-value
ROAA 477321 .00 .1382
R eturn -1550.00 .7149
Sales 466 .00 .0001
ROAAL 357808.00 .2772
R etum L 1566.00 .6719
groSales -11401.00 .0169
Adj. R2 0.71
F-value 13.51 .0001
(coefficient = 466, p-value < .0001) while groSales h a s  a  significantly 
negative rela tionsh ip  to the  response variable, to ta l com pensation 
(coefficient = -11401, p-value = .0169). All o ther variables are
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statistically  un re la ted  to to tal com pensation. In sum m ary , hypothesis 
one is rejected in the  large b a n k s  only model. The sa le s /s a le s  growth 
m axim ization theory is suppo rted  by the  significance of Sales b u t 
challenged by the  significantly negative rela tionship  of groSales. The 
p ro fit/shareho lder w ealth  m axim ization theory is no t supported .
R esults w hen using  only th e  sm aller 372 b an k s in  the  sam ple 
are reported  in  Table 4.8. H ypothesis one is rejected due  to the  overall 
significance of the  m odel (F-value = 6.61, p-value < .0001). The biggest 
difference is the  reduction  of ad ju sted  R2 from 0.775 in the  full sam ple 
model to 0 .584 in th is  sm all b a n k  model. Individual variable te s t 
resu lts  a re  a s  follows. Overall, a  slightly different p icture  em erges
Table 4.8. E stim ates of Total C om pensation for B ank  
Chief Executive Officers: Model 4
Independent Sm all B anks n  = 372
Variable Coefficient p-value
ROAA 127652.00 .0024
R eturn 699.00 .0792
Sales 2379.00 .0001
ROAAL 67088.00 .0818
R etum L 749.00 .0243
groSales -845.00 .2159
Adj. R2 0.58
F-value 6.61 .0001
as to w hat explanatory variables are rela ted  to the  response variable, 
to tal CEO com pensation. From  Table 4.8, ROAA exhibits a  
significantly positive relationship  to to tal com pensation  (coefficient = 
127652, p-value = .0024). Sales exhibits a  significantly positive
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relationship  to to ta l com pensation  (coefficient = 2379, p-value < 
.0001). R etum L  h a s  a significantly positive re la tionsh ip  to to ta l 
com pensation (coefficient = 749, p-value = .0243). Two variables are 
m oderately significant an d  positively rela ted  to to tal com pensation. 
These variables are  R eturn  (coefficient = 699, p-value = .0792) and  
ROAAL (coefficient = 67088, p-value = .0818). G row th in  sales, 
groSales, is insignificant (p-value = .2159). In sum m ary, hypothesis 
one is rejected in  th e  sm all b a n k s  only model. However, com pared to 
the  big b a n k  sam ple, a  very different se t of variables are  significant. 
The p ro fit/sh areh o ld er w ealth  m axim ization theory  is strongly 
supported  by the  significance of ROAA an d  R etum L  an d  m ildly 
supported  by R etu rn  and  ROAAL. The sa le s /s a le s  growth 
m axim ization theory is supported  by th e  significance of Sales. Also, 
com pared to the  full n=450 b a n k  sam ple, shareho lder re tu rn  variab les 
are now significant in  explaining to ta l com pensation.
Considering how the  sam ple is split in to  sm all an d  large banks, 
the  difference in resu lts  suggests th a t  size is still an  om itted variable, 
even though  sales are  include in  the  m odels. To validate the  
ro b u stn ess  of my m odels, I add  a  dum m y variable for size an d  for all 
in teractions betw een the  dum m y variable an d  explanatory  variables 
and  re -ru n  the  regression on the  full sam ple. B ecause the  hypothesis 
is still rejected, i.e., the  m odel F-value is significant, and  the  
coefficients rem ain  stable, the  m odel is ro b u st a s  to specification. This
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ro b u stn ess  check  is repeated  for each  hypothesis, w ith identical 
resu lts.
H ypothesis Two R esults
H20: N either the  p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth m axim ization theory 
no r the  sa le s /sa le s  grow th m axim ization theory  explains 
b a n k  CEO a n n u a l cash  com pensation.
The first m odel to te s t  hypothesis two is th e  full m odel th a t 
utilizes six explanatory  variables, including lagged variables, and  all 
450 b anks in  the  d a ta  set. The response or dependen t variable is 
A nnual C ash  C om pensation. To te s t the  p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth  
m axim ization theory, the  explanatory  or independen t variab les are 
ROAA, ROAAL, R eturn  an d  Retum L. To tes t th e  sa le s /sa le s  growth 
m axim ization theory, the  explanatory  or independen t variables are 
Sales and  groSales. The m odel re su lts  showed the  H au sm an  te s t for 
random  effects to be strongly rejected (p-value < .0001). The m odel 
specification F te s t for no fixed effects is strongly rejected (p-value < 
.0001). R esidual plots indicate  no violations of m odel assum p tions, b u t 
several possible outliers are  indicated on res idua l plots. F u rth e r 
investigation reveals th a t  none are  influential; therefore, no 
observations are  dropped. Evidence of som e collinearity is detected  in 
th is  m odel betw een the  variables ROAA and  ROAAL, b u t is determ ined  
to be a t an  acceptable level. The re su lts  of the  m odel u sing  th e  fixed 
effects procedure  are  p resen ted  in Table 4.9.
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Table 4.9. E stim ates of A nnual C om pensation for B ank  Chief
Executive Officers: Model 1
Independent Full Model n  = 450
Variable Coefficient p-value
ROAA 138744.00 .0001
R eturn 1348.00 .0001
Sales 204.00 .0001
ROAAL 13420.00 .6512
R etum L 624.00 .0214
groSales -2179.00 .0001
Adj. R2 0.86
F-value 30.32 .0001
H ypothesis two is rejected due  to the  overall significance of the  
m odel (F-value = 30.32, p-value < .0001). Individual variable te s t 
resu lts  are  a s  follows. From  Table 4.9, the  explanatory  variable ROAA 
is significant and  positively rela ted  to the  response  variable, A nnual 
C ash Com pensation (coefficient = 138744, p-value < .0001). R eturn  is 
significant and  positively rela ted  to A nnual C ash  C om pensation 
(coefficient = 1348, p-value < .0001). Sales is significant and  positively 
related to A nnual C ash  C om pensation (coefficient = 204, p-value < 
.0001). R etum L  is significant an d  positively rela ted  to A nnual C ash 
C om pensation (coefficient = 624, p-value = .0214). Variable groSales is 
significant b u t negatively rela ted  to A nnual C ash  C om pensation 
(coefficient = -2179, p-value < .0008). Only ROAAL is no t significant (p- 
value = .6512). In sum m ary , hypothesis two is rejected. The 
p ro fit/shareho lder w ealth  m axim ization theory is suppo rted  by the 
significance of ROAA, R etu rn  an d  Retum L. The sa le s /s a le s  growth
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m axim ization theory  is suppo rted  by the  significance of Sales b u t 
challenged by re su lts  for groSales.
The second m odel to te s t hypothesis two is again  the  full m odel 
th a t utilizes six explanatory  variables, including lagged variables. 
However, only the  78 largest b a n k s  in  the  d a ta  se t a re  included. The 
response or dependen t variable is A nnual C ash  C om pensation. To te s t 
the  p ro fit/shareho lder w ealth  m axim ization theory, the  explanatory  or 
independen t variables are ROAA, ROAAL, R etu rn  an d  Retum L. To te s t 
the  sa le s /sa le s  growth m axim ization theory, the  explanatory or 
independen t variables are  Sales and  groSales. The m odel resu lts  show  
the  H ausm an  tes t for random  effects to be strongly rejected (p-value = 
.0126). The m odel specification F te s t for no fixed effects is strongly 
rejected (p-value < .0001). R esidual plots indicate  no violations of 
m odel assum ptions, b u t  th ree  possible outliers are indicated on 
residual plots. F u rth e r investigation reveals none are influential; 
therefore, no observations are dropped. Evidence of som e collinearity 
is detected in  th is  m odel betw een the  variables ROAA an d  ROAAL, b u t 
is determ ined to be w ithin acceptable levels. The re su lts  of the  large 
b an k  m odel using  the  fixed effects procedure are  p resen ted  in  Table
4.10.
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Table 4 .10. E stim ates of A nnual C om pensation for B ank  Chief
Executive Officers: Model 2
Independent Large B anks n  = 78
Variable Coefficient p-value
ROAA 198027.00 .0363
R eturn 3261.00 .0091
Sales 201.00 .0001
ROAAL 53654.00 .5785
R etum L 2346.00 .0311
groSales -4359.00 .0019
Adj. R2 0.86
F-value 34.49 .0001
H ypothesis two is rejected due  to the  overall significance of the  
m odel (F-value = 34.49, p-value < .0001). Individual variable te s t 
p resen t a  very sim ilar p ictu re  to the  full sam ple m odel as to w hich 
explanatory variables are  rela ted  to the  response  variable, A nnual 
C ash C om pensation. From  Table 4.10, for large banks, the  
explanatory variable ROAA is significant and  positively related  to the  
response variable, A nnual C ash  C om pensation (coefficient = 198027, 
p-value = .0363). R etu rn  is significant and  positively rela ted  to A nnual 
C ash  C om pensation (coefficient = 3261, p-value = .0091). Sales is 
significant and  positively related  to A nnual C ash  C om pensation 
(coefficient = 201, p-value < .0001). R etum L  is significant and  
positively related  to A nnual C ash  C om pensation (coefficient = 2346, p- 
value = .0311). Variable groSales is significant b u t negatively re la ted  to 
A nnual C ash  C om pensation (coefficient = -4359, p-value = .0019). 
Only ROAAL is n o t significant (p-value = .5785). In sum m ary,
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hypothesis two is rejected. The p ro fit/sh areh o ld er w ealth  
m axim ization theory is supported  by the  significance of ROAA, R etu rn  
and  Retum L. The sa le s /sa le s  grow th m axim ization theory  is 
supported  by the  significance of Sales b u t  again  challenged by re su lts  
for groSales.
The th ird  m odel to tes t hypo thesis two is again  the  full m odel 
th a t utilizes six explanatory  variables, including lagged variables. Now, 
only the 372 sm aller b an k s in  the  d a ta  se t are  included. The response  
or dependent variable is a n n u a l cash  com pensation. To te s t the  
p ro fit/shareho lder w ealth  m axim ization theory, the  explanatory  or 
independent variables are  ROAA, ROAAL, R eturn  and  Retum L. To te s t 
the  sa le s /sa le s  growth m axim ization theory, the  explanatory  or 
independent variables are Sales an d  groSales. The m odel resu lts  
show s the  H ausm an  te s t for random  effects to be rejected (p-value = 
.0482). The m odel specification F te s t for no fixed effects is strongly 
rejected (p-value < .0001). R esidual plots indicate no violations of 
model assum ptions, b u t som e possible outliers are  indicated  on 
residual plots. F u rth e r investigation reveals th a t none are influential; 
therefore, no observations are  dropped. Evidence of som e collinearity 
is detected in  th is  m odel betw een the  variables ROAA an d  ROAAL, b u t 
is determ ined to be a t an  acceptable level. The re su lts  of the  sm all 
b an k  m odel using  the  fixed effects procedure are p resen ted  in  Table
4.11.
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Table 4.11. E stim ates of A nnual C om pensation for B ank  Chief
Executive Officers: Model 3
Independent Sm all B anks n  = 372
Variable Coefficient p-value
ROAA 49151.00 .0551
R eturn 864.00 .0004
Sales 1642.00 .0001
ROAAL 989.00 .9664
R etum L 396.00 .0507
groSales -1037.00 .0127
Adj. R2 0.55
F-value 5.76 .0001
H ypothesis two is rejected due  to the  overall significance of the  
m odel (F-value = 5.76, p-value < .0001). Individual variable tes t 
p resen t a  very sim ilar p icture to bo th  the  full sam ple an d  large b a n k  
sam ple m odels a s  to w hich explanatory  variables are  rela ted  to the  
response variable, A nnual C ash  C om pensation. Only slight reductions 
in p-values are observed. From  Table 4.11, for sm all banks, the 
explanatory variable ROAA is mildly significant an d  positively related 
to the  response  variable, A nnual C ash  C om pensation (coefficient = 
49151, p-value = .0551). R eturn  is significant and  positively related  to 
A nnual C ash  C om pensation (coefficient = 864, p-value = .0004). Sales 
is significant and  positively rela ted  to A nnual C ash  C om pensation 
(coefficient = 1642, p-value < .0001). R etum L  is m ildly significant and  
positively rela ted  to A nnual C ash  C om pensation (coefficient = 396, p- 
value = .0507). The variable groSales is significant b u t negatively 
related  to A nnual C ash C om pensation (coefficient = -1037, p-
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value = .0127). Only ROAAL is no t significant (p-value = .9664). In 
sum m ary, hypothesis two is rejected. The p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth  
m axim ization theory is supported  by the  significance of ROAA, R eturn  
and  Retum L. The sa le s /sa le s  grow th m axim ization theory is 
supported  by the  significance of Sales b u t challenged by resu lts  for 
groSales.
H ypothesis Three R esults
H30: Neither the  p ro fit/sh areh o ld er w ealth  m axim ization theory  
nor the  sa le s /sa le s  growth m axim ization theory explains 
b an k  CEO stock  option (non-cash) com pensation.
The first m odel to te s t hypothesis th ree  is the  full m odel th a t 
utilizes six explanatory variables, including lagged variables, and  all 
450 b an k s in the  d a ta  set. The response or dependen t variable is 
S tock O ption Com pensation. If no options are  received, th is  value is 
zero. To te s t the  p ro fit/shareho lder w ealth  m axim ization theory, the  
explanatory or independen t variables are  ROAA, ROAAL, R etu rn  and  
Retum L. To tes t th e  sa le s /sa le s  growth m axim ization theory, the  
explanatory or independen t variables are Sales an d  groSales. The 
m odel re su lts  show  the H ausm an  te s t for random  effects to be strongly 
rejected (p-value < .0001). The m odel specification F te s t for no fixed 
effects is strongly rejected (p-value < .0001). Evidence of som e 
collinearity is detected in th is  m odel betw een the  variables ROAA and  
ROAAL, b u t is determ ined to be w ith in  acceptable lim its.
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Residual plots ind icate  no violations of m odel assum p tions, b u t 
three obvious outliers are  ind icated  on the residual plots. F u rth e r 
investigation reveals th a t  all th ree  are influential; therefore, all th ree  
observations are dropped. The th ree  observations are from Citigroup, 
1998-2000. These th ree  option pay aw ards to taled  $600  million. The 
total option aw ards for all o th er 2 ,905 observations in  th e  study  
totaled $1 ,375  million. T hus, th e  inclusion  of the  th ree  outliers would 
rep resen t alm ost 30% of all option pay aw ards. A nalysis of the  th ree  
outliers using  DIFFITS an d  DFBETA sta tis tics  indicate th a t all are  
influential in  bo th  level an d  slope of the  coefficients; therefore, all 
th ree  observations are  dropped. The resu lts  of the  m odel for option pay 
using  the  fixed effects procedure  are p resen ted  in  Table 4.12.
Table 4.12. E stim ates of Option C om pensation for B ank 
Chief Executive Officers: Model 1
Independent
Variable
Full Model 
Coefficient
n  = 450 
p-value
ROAA 181079.00 .0333
R eturn -1281.00 .1482
Sales 359.00 .0001
ROAAL 103811.00 .2036
R etum L 171.00 .8198
groSales -2355.00 .0799
Adj. R2 0.60
F-value 7.09 .0001
H ypothesis three is rejected due to the  overall significance of the  
m odel (F-value = 7.09, p-value < .0001). Individual variable te s t  resu lts  
are a s  follows. From  Table 4 .12, ROAA is significant and  positively
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related to the  response variable, Stock Option C om pensation 
(coefficient = 181079, p-value = .0333). Sales is significant an d  
positively related  to Stock O ption C om pensation (coefficient = 359, p- 
value < .0001). V ariable groSales is mildly significant b u t negatively 
related to the  response variable, Stock Option C om pensation 
(coefficient = -2355, p-value = .0799). All o ther variables are  not 
significant. They are  R eturn  (p-value = .1482), ROAAL (p-value = 
.2036) and  R etum L  (p-value = .8198). In sum m ary , hypo thesis th ree  is 
rejected. The p ro fit/sh areh o ld er w ealth  m axim ization theory is 
supported  only by the  significance of ROAA. The sa le s /sa le s  growth 
m axim ization theory  is supported  by th e  significance of Sales b u t 
challenged by re su lts  for groSales.
The second m odel to te s t hypothesis th ree  includes only the  78 
largest b a n k s  in  th e  d a ta  set. The response or dependen t variable is 
Stock Option C om pensation. To tes t th e  p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth 
m axim ization theory, the  explanatory or independen t variables are 
ROAA, ROAAL, R eturn  and  Retum L. To te s t the  sa le s /sa le s  growth 
m axim ization theory, the  explanatory  or independen t variables are 
Sales and  groSales. The m odel resu lts  show  the  H ausm an  te s t for 
random  effects to be rejected (p-value = .0444). The m odel specification 
F te s t for no  fixed effects is strongly rejected (p-value < .0001). 
Residual plots, after the th ree  previously d iscussed  influential outliers 
are excluded, indicate no violations of m odel assum ptions. A few
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possible ou tliers are  indicated on res idua l plots. F u rth e r investigation 
reveals no m ore are influential; therefore, no fu rth er observations are  
dropped. Evidence of some mild collinearity is detected in  th is  m odel 
betw een th e  variables ROAA and  ROAAL, b u t is determ ined to be a t an  
acceptable level. The resu lts  of th e  large-bank  m odel u sing  the  fixed 
effects procedure are p resen ted  in Table 4.13.
H ypothesis th ree  is rejected due  to the  overall significance of the  
m odel (F-value = 5.77, p-value < .0001). Individual variable te s t re su lts  
are as follows. W hen only using  th e  largest banks, a very different 
p icture em erges as to w hat explanatory  variables are related  to the
Table 4 .13. E stim ates of O ption C om pensation for B ank Chief 
Executive Officers: Model 2
Independent Large B anks n  = 78
Variable Coefficient p-value
ROAA 360685.00 .2599
R eturn -4629.00 .2755
Sales 355.00 .0001
ROAAL 195926.00 .5503
R etum L -297.00 .9357
groSales -5759.00 .2321
Adj. R2 0.52
F-value 5.77 .0001
response variable, S tock Option C om pensation. From  Table 4 .13, only 
the  explanatory variable Sales is significant an d  positively rela ted  to 
the  response variable, Stock O ption C om pensation (coefficient = 355, 
p-value < .0001). All o ther variables are  no t significant. They are ROAA 
(p-value = .2599), R eturn  (p-value = .2755), ROAAL (p-value = .5503),
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R etum L (p-value = .9357), an d  groSales (p-value = .2321). In 
sum m ary, hypothesis th ree  is rejected. The sa le s /s a le s  growth 
m axim ization theory is suppo rted  by the  significance of Sales. The 
p ro fit/shareho lder w ealth  m axim ization theory is no t supported .
The final m odel to te s t hypo thesis th ree  is com prised of the  372 
sm allest b a n k s  in  the  d a ta  set. The response or dependen t variable is 
Stock Option C om pensation. To te s t th e  p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth  
m axim ization theory, th e  explanatory  or independen t variables are  
ROAA, ROAAL, R eturn  and  R etum L. To tes t the  sa le s /sa le s  growth 
m axim ization theory, th e  explanatory  or independen t variables are 
Sales and  groSales. The m odel re su lts  show  the H au sm an  te s t for 
random  effects to be rejected (p-value = .0146). The m odel specification 
F tes t for no fixed effects is strongly rejected (p-value < .0001). 
Residual plots, after the  th ree  previously d iscussed  in fluential ou tliers 
are dropped; indicate no violations of m odel assum p tions. A few 
possible outliers are indicated  on residual plots. F u rth e r investigation 
reveals no m ore are influential; therefore, no fu rth er observations are 
dropped. Evidence of som e collinearity is detected in  th is  m odel 
betw een th e  variables ROAA an d  ROAAL, b u t is determ ined to be well 
w ithin acceptable lim its. The re su lts  of the  sm all-bank  m odel u sing  
the  fixed effects procedure are  p resen ted  in Table 4.14.
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Table 4.14. E stim ates of Option C om pensation for B ank Chief
Executive Officers: Model 3
Independent Sm all B anks n  = 372
Variable Coefficient p-value
ROAA 80364.00 .0128
R eturn -186.00 .5429
Sales 724.00 .0149
ROAAL 65862.00 .0251
R etum L 381.00 .1374
groSales 208.00 .6904
Adj. R2 0.46
F-value 3 .89 .0001
H ypothesis th ree  is rejected due to the  overall significance of the  
m odel (F-value = 3.89, p-value < .0001). W hen only using  the  sm aller 
banks, re su lts  are  closer to the  full d a ta  se t resu lts , b u t are still 
different. Individual variable te s t resu lts  are  a s  follows. From  Table 
4.14, the  explanatory  variable ROAA is significant and  positively 
related  to the  response variable, S tock O ption C om pensation 
(coefficient = 80364, p-value = .0129). Sales are  significant and  
positively related  to the  response variable, S tock O ption C om pensation 
(coefficient = 724, p-value = .0149). ROAAL is significant and  positively 
related  to Stock Option com pensation (coefficient = 65862, p-value = 
.0251). All o ther variables are  no t significant. They are  R eturn  (p-value 
= .5429), R etum L  (p-value = .1374), and  groSales (p-value = .6904). In 
sum m ary, hypothesis th ree  is rejected. The p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth 
m axim ization theory is supported  by th e  significance of ROAA and
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ROAAL. The sa le s /sa le s  grow th m axim ization theory is supported  by 
the significance of Sales.
In the  previous two m odels, especially the  large-bank  sam ple, 
relatively few variables are significant in  explaining Stock Option 
Com pensation. This could occur because  only 65%, or 296, of 450 
ban k s actively utilize stock options a s  p a rt of the ir com pensation  
packages. To b e tte r predict option-based  pay, p e rh ap s only those  
b an k s th a t utilize options shou ld  be include in  the  sta tis tica l m odels. 
Analysis of the  230 of the  372 sm all b a n k s  and  the  66 of the  78 largest 
banks, th a t actually  aw arded options, yielded resu lts  virtually  
identical to the  two previous m odels; therefore, re su lts  a re  no t include 
here.
Sum m ary of R esults
Hypothesis H l0 is rejected. S upport is found for bo th  theories of 
com pensation in th ree  of the  four m odel specifications. S upport is 
found both  for and  against the  sa le s /sa le s  growth m axim ization theory  
in the large-bank, n  = 78, model. There are several differences as to 
w hich explanatory variables are  significant for each b a n k  sam ple.
H ypothesis H20 is rejected. S upport is found for bo th  theories of 
com pensation in each of the  th ree  m odel specifications. Evidence 
against the  sales growth m axim ization theory is also found. There are 
no differences as to w hich explanatory  variables are  significant, b u t 
there are  changes in  the  level of significance of the  variables.
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H ypothesis H30 is rejected. S upport is found for bo th  theories of 
com pensation in the  full sam ple, n  = 450, and  the  n  = 372, sm all-bank  
model. S upport is found for only the  sa le s /sa le s  grow th m axim ization 
theory in th e  n  = 78, large-bank  model. There are  several differences 
as to w hich explanatory  variables are significant for each b a n k  sam ple.
Sum m ary
This ch ap ter begins w ith a  descrip tion of the  sam ple. Descriptive 
sta tistics on the  entire aggregated sam ple, for th e  large b a n k  sam ple, 
and  for com ponents of com pensation  are provided. R esults of 
sta tistical te s ts  of each  of the  th ree  hypotheses are provided. C hap ter 
5 provides a sum m ary  an d  im plications of the  resu lts , the  
contributions of th is  study  an d  suggestions for fu tu re  research .
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
This chap ter p resen ts  in  th ree  m ain  sections. F irst, a  sum m ary  
and  im plications of th e  resu lts , by hypothesis, is provided. Second, the  
con tribu tions of th is  study  are d iscussed . Finally, suggestions for 
fu tu re  research  are provided.
Sum m ary  and  Im plications of the  R esults 
R esults of te s ts  of hypotheses show  strong  su p p o rt for bo th  
theories of CEO com pensation  investigated in  th is  study, unlike m any 
previous stud ies. However, sub -sam ples of b a n k s  often yield different 
pay-perform ance linkages. B ecause each hypothesis te s ts  a  different 
definition or com ponent of CEO com pensation, d iscussion  of resu lts  
follow one hypothesis a t a  time.
H ypothesis One C onclusions
H l0: Neither the  p ro fit/shareho lder w ealth  m axim ization theory 
nor the  sales /s a le s  growth m axim ization theory explains 
b a n k  CEO to tal com pensation.
88
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
89
The first m odel tes ted  (Table 4.5) con ta ins only 
contem poraneous explanatory  variables, like the  m ajority  of previous 
research, while the  second m odel (Table 4.6) includes lagged variables, 
rarely u sed  previously. Both m odels strongly rejected hypothesis one 
and  show  strong su p p o rt for bo th  com pensation  theories. In both, a  
0.1% increase  in re tu rn  on average a sse ts  re su lts  in  an  increase  of 
over $29,000 in  CEO com pensation. Also, a  0.1% increase  in  the  
previous year’s re tu rn  on average a sse ts  re su lts  in  a n  increase  of 
$14,744 in  CEO com pensation. These re su lts  su p p o rt the  
p ro fit/shareho lder w ealth  m axim ization theory an d  dem onstra te  the  
value of lagged variables to explain CEO pay. Of in te res t is th a t 
shareho lder re tu rn  is no t significant a t a  tim e w hen m ost resea rch  is 
trying to estab lish  links betw een pay and  m arke t-based  variables.
Sales are also very strongly related  to CEO com pensation, 
yielding an  increase of $477 to $486 of pay for each  $1 million 
increase in  sales. While th is  resu lt for sales su p p o rts  B aum ol’s (1959 
and  1967) sales m axim ization theory, the  significantly negative 
relationship  betw een growth of sa les and  pay refu tes B aum ol’s (1962) 
sales growth m axim ization theory. This resu lt is no t entirely w ithout 
precedent. W inn an d  S hoenhair (1988) and  Agrawal, M akhija, and  
M andelker (1991) are  two non-bank ing  stud ies th a t  find sales growth 
to be negatively related  to pay. My findings m ay suppo rt B aum ol’s 
contention  th a t m anagers m ay indeed have non-pecuniary  incentives
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to increase revenue. My findings m ay also suggest th a t grow th of sales 
m ay only be u sefu l in  explaining specific com ponents of pay as 
opposed to to tal com pensation.
Hypothesis one is nex t tes ted  by using  su b se ts  of the  full 450  
b an k  model. Model th ree  (Table 4.7) u ses  only the  largest 78 b an k s in  
the  study, allowing com parisons to previous research  an d  com parisons 
to b an k s no t previously investigated. The only variables rela ted  to to tal 
com pensation in  these  large b a n k s  are sa les an d  grow th of sales. The 
resu lt for sales is sim ilar to the  full model, an  increase  in CEO to ta l 
pay of $466 for every $1 m illion increase  in  sales, supporting  the sales 
m axim ization theory. Also, th e  negative rela tionship  betw een pay and  
growth of sales is found, refuting the  sales growth theory. This large- 
b an k  resu lt is unexpected, because  m ost b an k  an d  no n -b an k  stud ies 
in the  la s t ten  years find a t least a  w eak link  betw een pay and  the  
p ro fit/shareho lder w ealth m axim ization theory. In con trast, a  very 
different p icture is found for the  sm aller banks, previously no t u sed  in  
com pensation research .
The resu lts  from m odel 4, Table 4.8, reject hypothesis one and  
show broad  su p p o rt for bo th  com pensation  theories. R eturn  on 
average a sse ts  is strongly linked to to tal com pensation  and, m ore 
im portantly, the previous year’s shareholder re tu rn  is also strongly 
linked to total com pensation. C urren t shareho lder re tu rn  and  the  
previous year’s re tu rn  on a sse ts  are bo th  m oderately linked to to tal
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CEO com pensation. T hus, veiy strong  su p p o rt is found for the  
p ro fit/shareho lder w ealth  m axim ization theory, w hen looking a t the  
sm aller banks. The sales m axim ization theory  is also supported  by the  
strong link betw een sales and  to tal com pensation. For a  $1 million 
increase in  sales, to ta l pay increases $2,379. It is in teresting  th a t  sa les 
increases are  approxim ately five tim es m ore valuable to th e  CEO of the  
sm aller banks, $2,379, th a n  to the  CEO of the  large b anks, $466. 
Also, o ther perform ance m easu res are  im portan t to the  sm aller b an k  
CEOs; while, only the  scale of operations is im portan t to the  larger 
b an k  CEOs. We will see th is  again  w hen option pay is d iscussed . Next, 
we tu rn  to only th e  “c a sh ” com ponents of to tal CEO com pensation.
H ypothesis Two C onclusions
H20: N either the  p ro fit/sha reho lder w ealth  m axim ization theory  
no r the  sa le s /sa le s  growth m axim ization theory explains 
b a n k  CEO a n n u a l cash  com pensation.
R esults for all th ree  CEO an n u a l cash  com pensation  m odels are  
identical, regarding w hich variables are significantly rela ted  to pay. 
The only differences are level of significance and  a few key differences 
in pay-perform ance sensitivities. All th ree  m odels, Tables 4 .9-4 .11, 
strongly reject hypothesis two an d  provide suppo rt for bo th  
com pensation theories. All variables, except the  previous year’s re tu rn  
on asse ts , are strongly related to cash  com ponents of com pensation.
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Growth of sa les is again  negatively re la ted  to pay, refu ting  the sales 
growth theory.
Supporting th e  p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth  m axim ization theory 
are re tu rn  on asse ts , shareho lder re tu rn  an d  the  prior y ear’s 
shareholder re tu rn . As shou ld  be expected, the  pay-perform ance 
sensitivities (coefficients) for the  larger ban k s, Table 4 .10, are  h igher 
th a n  for the  sm aller banks, Table 4 .11. This is n o t unexpected; 
because, a  percentage change in  ROAA or R etu rn  would generate far 
larger increases in  to ta l dollars of profits or shareho lder w ealth  in  th e  
big banks. For exam ple, a  0.1%  increase  in re tu rn  on a sse ts  resu lts  in  
an  increase  in  a n n u a l cash  com pensation  of $19,803 for large-bank 
CEOs, as opposed to $4 ,915  for sm aller-bank  CEOs. Also, a  1% 
increase in  re tu rn  to shareho lders re su lts  in  an  increase  in  a n n u a l 
cash  com pensation of $3,261 for large-bank  CEOs, as opposed to 
$864 for sm aller-bank  CEOs. W hen looking a t to tal asse ts , the  large 
b an k s  are 48 tim es larger, on average; yet, the  pay sensitivity is only 4 
tim es larger. Are pay-perform ance linkages stronger in  sm aller b an k s?
The significance of sales, in  all th ree  m odels, again  su p p o rts  the  
sales m axim ization theory. A $1 m illion increase  in sales resu lts  in  
cash  com pensation increases of $201 for large-bank  CEOs and  $1,642 
for sm all-bank  CEOs. Sales increases are  over eight tim es m ore 
valuable to the  CEO of the  sm aller b a n k s  th a n  to the  CEO of the  large 
banks. Again, I find a  stronger linkage betw een pay an d  perform ance
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
93
for the  sm aller b a n k  CEOs, even though  bo th  are sta tistically  strong  
relationships.
H ypothesis Three C onclusions
H30: N either the  p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth  m axim ization theory  
nor th e  sa le s /sa le s  growth m axim ization theory  explains 
b a n k  CEO stock  option (non-cash) com pensation. 
H ypothesis th ree  is strongly rejected for all m odels testing  only 
CEO option com pensation. In the  full 450 b a n k  model, Table 4 .12, 
both  re tu rn  on a sse ts  an d  sales show  strong  links to option pay, 
supporting  bo th  com pensation  theories. However, b a n k  size again  
resu lts  in different linkages. For the  78 larger banks, Table 4.13, only 
sales are significantly linked to CEO option pay. A $1 million increase 
in sales yields $355  m ore option aw ards to the  average CEO. This 
resu lt, along w ith large b a n k  resu lts  for to ta l pay, is som ew hat 
su rp rising  considering recen t research  generally finds positive linkages 
betw een shareho lder w ealth  an d  CEO to tal or option pay.
For the  372 sm aller banks, Table 4.14, strong  linkages are 
found betw een option com pensation  and  re tu rn  on asse ts , prior re tu rn  
on asse ts, and  sales. Option com pensation  increases $8 ,036 for a  
0.1% increase in  re tu rn  on a sse ts  and  increases $6 ,582  for a  0.1% 
increase in  re tu rn  on previous year’s asse ts. Option com pensation  
increases $724 for each additional $1 million increase  in  sales. While 
accounting-based  variables are m uch  less prevalent in  recen t
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research, th e  positive re su lt is typical. Overall, su p p o rt for bo th  the 
p ro fit/shareho lder w ealth  m axim ization theory  an d  the  sales 
m axim ization theory is found w hen investigating CEO option pay.
In sum m ary, th is  research  strongly su p p o rts  bo th  com pensation 
theories in  each  of th e  th ree  tested  definitions of CEO pay. Negative 
relationships betw een pay an d  growth of sales are  contrary  to 
expectations; however, fu tu re  research  on m ore narrow  definitions of 
pay m ight yield expected resu lts . For the  larger b an k s, representative 
of b ank  sam ples of earlier research , less suppo rt is found for the  profit 
or shareho lder w ealth  m axim ization theory. In th is  study, scale of 
operations dom inates o ther linkages betw een pay an d  perform ance. 
Sm aller b a n k s  show  stronger linkages to pay th a n  larger banks.
C ontributions of th is  S tudy 
A prim ary  con tribu tion  of th is  research  is th e  strong  su p p o rt 
th a t both  theories of com pensation, the  p ro fit/sh a reh o ld er w ealth  
m axim ization theory an d  the sa le s /sa le s  growth m axim ization theory, 
are still viable theories, are  necessary  to explain CEO com pensation  in 
the  banking  industry . P erhaps the  om ission of B aum ol’s sa les and  
sales growth theories is p rem ature . Second, th e  increase  in  sam ple 
size, including over 350 b an k s no t previously used , greatly ex tends the  
b read th  of prior research . The ability to com pare larger and  sm aller 
b an k s added insigh ts no t previously discovered. Third, the  consisten t 
significance of accounting-based  perform ance variables, and  th e  few
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instances of the  m arke t-based  variab les being significant, m ight help 
reverse the  recen t tren d  of including only m arke t-based  variables. 
Fourth, th e  significance of lagged variables in  each of th e  th ree  
definitions of CEO com pensation  dem onstra tes the  need for th e ir u se  
in far m ore research  th a n  previously used . Finally, the  pay- 
perform ance linkage appears m uch  stronger for sm aller b a n k s  
resulting  in  larger or relatively larger perform ance rew ards for CEOs of 
these  sm aller banks.
Suggestions for F u tu re  R esearch,i ■.
F u tu re  research  shou ld  ad d ress  the  following issues. First, m ore 
com ponents or su b se ts  of com ponents of CEO com pensation  need  to 
be analyzed. Also, the  com ponents of com pensation  could be m odeled 
as a system  of equations, allowing for various hypothesis tes ts . For 
example, a t the  m argin, how m any dollars of option com pensation  are 
needed to replace a dollar of cash  com pensation, and  vice-versa?
Second, a  s tudy  to determ ine w hen or u n d e r w hat conditions 
b an k s begin to utilize option pay in  th e ir com pensation  packages is 
needed. O ptions rep resen t over 50% of to tal com pensation in  my 
overall sam ple; yet, 31% of b an k s in  th is  s tudy  have never aw arded 
options.
R esearch could also ad d ress  the  following issues. One, in 
conjunction w ith point one, the  sam ple of b a n k s  shou ld  be broken  into 
m ore sub-groups along size or possibly along regional lines. Two,
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include m ore theories of com pensation  into the  m odels, 
sim ultaneously  testing  for all. R esearch  is typically restric ted  to two, or 
a t m ost th ree , theories of com pensation  in  any one study. Finally, 
extend the d a ta  se t in bo th  d irections in  tim e and  investigate issu es  
su ch  as s tru c tu ra l shifts in  com pensation  com position.
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LIST OF SAMPLE BANKS
1ST SOURCE CORP 
ABC BANCORP 
ACNB CORP
ALABAMA NATL BANCORPORATION 
ALLIANCE FINANCIAL CORP/NY 
AMCORE FINANCIAL INC 
AMEGY BANCORPORATION INC 
AMERICAN BANK INC/PA 
AMERICAN NATL BANKSHARES 
AMERICANWEST BANCORP 
AMERISERV FINANCIAL INC/PA 
AMES NATIONAL CORP 
AMSOUTH BANCORPORATION 
ARROW FINANCIAL CORP 
ASSOCIATED BANC-CORP 
ASTORIA FINANCIAL CORP 
AUBURN NATIONAL BANCORP 
BANC CORP 
BANCFIRST CORP/OK 
BANCORP RHODE ISLAND INC 
BANCORPSOUTH INC 
BANCTRUST FINANCIAL GRP INC 
BANK KY FINANCIAL CORP 
BANK MARIN CORTE MADERA CA 
BANK MUTUAL CORP 
BANK OF AMERICA CORP 
BANK OF COMMERCE HOLDINGS 
BANK OF GRANITE CORPORATION 
BANK OF HAWAII CORP 
BANK OF NEW YORK CO INC 
BANK OF THE OZARKS INC 
BANKATLANTIC BANCORP 
BANKUNITED FINANCIAL CORP 
BANNER CORP 
BAR HARBOR BANKSHARES 
BAYLAKE CORP
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BB&T CORP 
BCSB BANKCORP INC 
BERKSHIRE BANCORP INC 
BNCCORP INC 
BOK FINANCIAL CORP 
BOSTON PRIVATE FINL HLDGS 
BRIDGE BANCORP INC 
BROOKLINE BANCORP INC 
BRYN MAWR BANK CORP 
BWC FINANCIAL CORP 
C&F FINANCIAL CORP 
CAMCO FINANCIAL CORP 
CAMDEN NATIONAL CORP 
CAPITAL BANK CORP/NC 
CAPITAL CITY BK GROUP INC 
CAPITAL CORP OF THE WEST 
CAPITAL CROSSING BANK 
CAPITOL BANCORP LTD 
CAPITOL FEDERAL FINANCIAL 
CARDINAL FINANCIAL CORP 
CASCADE BANCORP 
CASCADE FINANCIAL CORP 
CATHAY GENERAL BANCORP 
CAVALRY BANCORP INC 
CENTER BANCORP INC 
CENTERSTATE BANKS OF FLORIDA 
CENTRAL COAST BANCORP 
CENTRAL PACIFIC FINANCIAL CP 
CENTRUE FINANCIAL CORP 
CENTURY BANCORP INC/MA 
CFS BANCORP INC 
CHARTER FINANCIAL CORP/GA 
CHEMICAL FINANCIAL CORP 
CHESTER VY BANCORP INC 
CHITTENDEN CORP 
CITIGROUP INC 
CITIZENS & NORTHERN CORP 
CITIZENS BANKING CORP 
CITIZENS FINANCIAL SVCS INC 
CITIZENS FIRST BANCORP INC 
CITIZENS HOLDING CO 
CITIZENS SOUTH BANKING CORP 
CITY HOLDING COMPANY 
CITY NATIONAL CORP 
CITYBANK
CNB FINANCIAL CORP/PA
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COASTAL FINANCIAL CORP/DE 
COBIZ INC
COLONIAL BANCGROUP 
COLONY BANKCORP INC 
COLUMBIA BANCORP 
COLUMBIA BANCORP/OR 
COLUMBIA BANKING SYSTEM INC 
COMERICA INC.
COMM BANCORP INC 
COMMERCE BANCORP IN C/N J 
COMMERCE BANCSHARES INC 
COMMERCIAL BANKSHARES INC 
COMMERCIAL CAPITAL BANCORP 
COMMERCIAL FEDERAL CORP 
COMMUNITY BANCORP INC/CA 
COMMUNITY BANK SYSTEM INC 
COMMUNITY BANKS INC 
COMMUNITY BANKSHARES INC/SC 
COMMUNITY BK NORTHERN VA 
COMMUNITY BK SHARES INC/IN 
COMMUNITY CAPITAL CORP 
COMMUNITY TRUST BANCORP INC 
COMPASS BANCSHARES INC 
COOPERATIVE BANKSHARES INC 
CORTLAND BANCORP 
CORUS BANKSHARES INC 
CRESCENT BANKING CO 
CROGHAN BANCSHARES INC 
CULLEN/FROST BANKERS INC 
CVB FINANCIAL CORP 
DCB FINANCIAL CORP 
DEARBORN BANCORP INC 
DESERT COMMUNITY BANK 
DIME COMMUNITY BANCSHARES 
DNB FINANCIAL CORP 
DORAL FINANCIAL CORP 
DOWNEY FINANCIAL CORP 
EAGLE BANCORP INC/MD 
EAST WEST BANCORP INC 
EASTERN VA BANKSHARES INC 
ECB BANCORP INC 
EFC BANCORP INC 
ENTERPRISE FINL SERVICES CP 
EPHRATA NATIONAL BANK PA 
ESB FINANCIAL CORP 
EXCHANGE NATL BANCSHARES
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F N B CORP/FL 
F N B CORP/VA
FARMERS & MERCHANTS BANCORP 
FARMERS CAPITAL BANK CORP 
FARMERS NATL BANC CORP/OH 
FEDERAL TRUST CORP 
FFLC BANCORP INC 
FIDELITY BANCORP INC/PA 
FIDELITY BANKSHARES INC 
FIDELITY SOUTHERN CORP 
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS INC 
FIRST BANCORP P R 
FIRST BANCORP/NC 
FIRST BUSEY CORP 
FIRST CAPITAL INC 
FIRST CHARTER CORP 
FIRST CHESTER CNTY CORP 
FIRST CITIZENS BANC CORP 
FIRST CITIZENS BANCSHARES 
FIRST CMNTY BANCSHARES INC 
FIRST COMMONWLTH FINL CP/PA 
FIRST COMMUNITY BANCORP/CA 
FIRST DEFIANCE FINANCIAL CP 
FIRST FED BANKSHARES INC 
FIRST FEDERAL BANCSHARES/AR 
FIRST FINANCIAL CORP/IN 
FIRST FINANCIAL HOLDINGS INC 
FIRST FINANCIAL SERVICE CORP 
FIRST FINL BANCORP INC/OH 
FIRST FINL BANKSHARES INC 
FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL CORP 
FIRST INDIANA CORP 
FIRST KEYSTONE CORP 
FIRST KEYSTONE FINANCIAL INC 
FIRST LONG ISLAND CORP 
FIRST M&F CORP 
FIRST MARINER BANCORP 
FIRST MERCHANTS CORP 
FIRST MIDWEST BANCORP INC 
FIRST MUTUAL BANCSHARES INC 
FIRST NATL CMNTY BANCORP INC 
FIRST NATL LINCOLN CORP/M E 
FIRST NIAGARA FINL GRP INC 
FIRST NORTHN CMNTY BANCORP 
FIRST PACTRUST BANCORP
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FIRST PLACE FINANCIAL C P/D E  
FIRST REGIONAL BANCORP 
FIRST REPUBLIC BANK 
FIRST SOUTH BANCORP INC/VA 
FIRST STATE BANCORPORATION 
FIRST UNITED CORP 
FIRSTBANK CORP 
FIRSTFED FINANCIAL CORP/CA 
FIRSTMERIT CORP 
FLAG FINANCIAL CORP 
FLAGSTAR BANCORP INC 
FLUSHING FINANCIAL CORP 
FMS FINANCIAL CORP 
FNB CORP/NC
FNB FINANCIAL SERVICES CORP 
FOOTHILL INDPT BANCORP 
FRANKLIN FINANCIAL SVCS CORP 
FREMONT GENERAL CORP 
FRONTIER FINANCIAL CORP/WA 
FST OAK BROOK BANCSHARES 
FULTON FINANCIAL CORP 
G B & T BANCSHARES INC 
GERMAN AMERICAN BANCORP 
GLACIER BANCORP INC 
GOLD BANC CORP INC 
GOLDEN WEST FINANCIAL CORP 
GREAT SOUTHERN BANCORP 
GREATER BAY BANCORP 
GREATER COMMUNITY BANCORP 
GREENE CNTY BANCHARES INC 
GUARANTY BANCSHARES INC/TX 
HANCOCK HOLDING CO 
HANMI FINANCIAL CORP 
HARBOR FLORIDA BANCSHARES 
HARLEYSVILLE NATL CORP/PA 
HARLEYSVILLE SVGS FINL CORP 
HARRINGTON WEST FINL GROUP 
HEARTLAND FINANCIAL USA INC 
HERITAGE COMMERCE CORP 
HERITAGE FINANCIAL CORP 
HF FINANCIAL CORP 
HIBERNIA CORP 
HINGHAM INSTN FOR SAVINGS 
HMN FINANCIAL INC 
HOPFED BANCORP INC 
HORIZON BANCORP/IN
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HUDSON CITY BANCORP INC 
HUDSON UNITED BANCORP 
HUDSON VALLEY HOLDING CORP 
HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES 
IBERIABANK CORP 
IBT BANCORP INC 
INDEPENDENCE CMNTY BK CORP 
INDEPENDENT BANK CORP/MA 
INDEPENDENT BANK CORP/MI 
INDYMAC BANCORP INC 
INTEGRA BANK CORP 
INTEGRITY FINANCIAL CORP 
INTERCHANGE FINL SVCS C P /N J 
INTERVEST BANCSHARES CORP 
INTL BANCSHARES CORP 
INVESTORS FINANCIAL SVCS CP 
IRWIN FINANCIAL CORP 
ITLA CAPITAL CORP 
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO 
KEYCORP
LAKELAND BANCORP INC 
LAKELAND FINANCIAL CORP 
LCNB CORP
LEESPORT FINANCIAL CORP
LINCOLN BANCORP/IN
LNB BANCORP INC
LONG ISLAND FINANCIAL CORP
LSB BANCSHARES INC/NC
LSB CORP
M & T BANK CORP
MACATAWA BANK CORP
MAF BANCORP INC
MAIN STREET BANKS INC
MAIN STREET TRUST INC
MAINSOURCE FINL GROUP INC
MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORP
MASSBANK CORP READING MA
MATRIX BANCORP INC
MB FINANCIAL INC/MD
MBT FINANCIAL CORP
MELLON FINANCIAL CORP
MERCANTILE BANK CORP
MERCANTILE BANKSHARES CORP
MERCHANTS & MFRS BANCORP INC
MERCHANTS BANCSHARES INC/VT
META FINANCIAL GROUP INC
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METROCORP BANCSHARES INC 
MFB CORP
MIDDLEBURG FINANCIAL CORP 
MIDSOUTH BANCORP INC 
MID-STATE BANCSHARES 
MIDWEST BANC HLDGS INC 
MIDWESTONE FINANCIAL GROUP 
MONROE BANCORP 
MUTUALFIRST FINANCIAL INC 
N B T BANCORP INC 
NASB FINANCIAL INC 
NATIONAL BANKSHARES INC VA 
NATIONAL CITY CORP 
NATIONAL PENN BANCSHARES INC 
NB & T FINANCIAL GROUP INC 
NBC CAPITAL CORP 
NETBANK INC
NEW HAMPSHIRE THRIFT BNCSHRS 
NEW YORK CMNTY BANCORP INC 
NEWMIL BANCORP INC 
NORTH BAY BANCORP/CA 
NORTH CENTRAL BANCSHARES INC 
NORTH FORK BANCORPORATION 
NORTH VALLEY BANCORP 
NORTHEAST BANCRP 
NORTHEAST PA FINANCIAL CORP 
NORTHERN EMPIRE BANCSHARE 
NORTHERN STATES FINANCIAL CP 
NORTHERN TRUST CORP 
NORTHRIM BANCORP INC 
NORTHWAY FINANCIAL INC 
NORTHWEST BANCORP INC 
OAK HILL FINANCIAL INC 
OCEANFIRST FINANCIAL CORP 
OHIO VALLEY BANC CORP 
OLD NATIONAL BANCORP 
OLD POINT FINANCIAL CORP 
OLD SECOND BANCORP INC/IL 
OMEGA FINANCIAL CORP 
ORIENTAL FINANCIAL GROUP INC 
ORRSTOWN FINANCIAL SVCS INC 
PAB BANKSHARES INC 
PACIFIC CAPITAL BANCORP 
PACIFIC CONTINENTAL CORP 
PACIFIC MERCANTILE BANCORP 
PAMRAPO BANCORP INC
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PARK NATIONAL CORP 
PARKVALE FINANCIAL CORP 
PARTNERS TRUST FINL GRP INC 
PEAPACK-GLADSTONE FINL CORP 
PENNFED FINANCIAL SVCS INC 
PENNROCK FINANCIAL SVCS 
PENNS WOODS BANCORP INC 
PENNSYLVANIA COMM BANCORP 
PEOPLES BANCORP AUBURN IN 
PEOPLES BANCORP INC/OH 
PEOPLES BANCORP NC INC 
PEOPLES BANCTRUST INC 
PEOPLE'S BANK/CT 
PEOPLES CMNTY BANCORP INC 
PEOPLES FINANCIAL CORP/M S 
PNC FINANCIAL SVCS GROUP INC 
POCAHONTAS BANCORP INC 
POPULAR INC
PREMIER CMNTY BANKSHARES INC 
PREMIER FINANCIAL BANCORP 
PREMIERWEST BANCORP 
PRINCETON NATL BANCORP INC 
PRIVATEBANCORP INC 
PROSPERITY BANCSHARES INC 
PROVIDENT BANKSHARES CORP 
PROVIDENT FINANCIAL HOLDINGS 
PSB BANCORP INC 
PULASKI FINANCIAL CORP 
PVF CAPITAL CORP 
QCR HOLDINGS INC 
R&G FINANCIAL CORP 
REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP 
RENASANT CORP 
REPUBLIC BANCORP INC 
REPUBLIC BANCORP INC/KY 
REPUBLIC FIRST BANCORP INC 
RIGGS NATIONAL CORP 
ROYAL BANCSHARES/PA 
RURBAN FINANCIAL CORP 
S & T BANCORP INC 
SANDY SPRING BANCORP INC 
SANTANDER BANCORP 
SAVANNAH BANCORP INC 
SCBT FINANCIAL CORP 
SEACOAST BANKING CORP/FL 
SECURITY BANK CORP
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SEVERN BANCORP INC 
SHORE BANCSHARES INC 
SIERRA BANCORP/CA 
SIMMONS FIRST NATL CORP 
SKY FINANCIAL GROUP INC 
SMITHTOWN BANCORP INC 
SOUTH FINANCIAL GROUP INC 
SOUTHERN CMNTY FINL CORP 
SOUTHSIDE BANCSHARES INC 
SOUTHWEST BANCORP INC 
SOVEREIGN BANCORP INC 
STATE BANCORP/NY 
STATE FINL SVCS CORP 
STATE STREET CORP 
STERLING BANCORP/NY 
STERLING BANCSHRS/TX 
STERLING FINANCIAL CORP 
STERLING FINANCIAL CORP/WA 
SUFFOLK BANCORP 
SUMMIT BANCSHARES INC/TX 
SUMMIT BANK CORP/GA 
SUN BANCORP IN C/N J 
SUNTRUST BANKS INC 
SUSQUEHANNA BANCSHARES INC 
SVB FINANCIAL GROUP 
SVB FINANCIAL SERVICES INC 
SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CP 
TAYLOR CAP GROUP INC 
TCF FINANCIAL CORP 
TD BANKNORTH INC 
TEAM FINANCIAL INC 
TECHE HOLDING CO 
TEXAS REGL BCSHS INC 
TEXAS UTD BANCSHARES INC 
TF FINANCIAL CORP 
TIB FINANCIAL CORP 
TIERONE CORP 
TIMBERLAND BANCORP INC 
TOMPKINSTRUSTCO INC 
TOWER FINANCIAL CORP 
TRICO BANCSHARES 
TRUSTCO BANK CORP/NY 
TRUSTMARK CORP 
U S B  HOLDING INC 
U S BANCORP 
UCBH HOLDINGS INC
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UMB FINANCIAL CORP 
UMPQUA HOLDINGS CORP 
UNION BANKSHARES CORP 
UNIONBANCAL CORP 
UNIONBANCORP INC 
UNITED BANCSHARES INC/OH 
UNITED BANKSHARES INC/WV 
UNITED COMMUNITY BANKS INC 
UNITED COMMUNITY FINL CORP 
UNITED SEC BANCSHARES INC 
UNITED SECURITY BANCSHARS CA 
UNITY BANCORP INC 
UNIVEST CORP OF PENNSYLVANIA 
UNIZAN FINANCIAL CORP 
VAIL BANKS INC 
VALLEY NATIONAL BANCORP 
VINEYARD NATL BANCORP 
VIRGINIA COMM BANCORP INC 
VIRGINIA FINANCIAL GROUP 
W HOLDING CO INC 
WACHOVIA CORP 
WAINWRIGHT BANK & TRUST CO 
WASHINGTON BANKING CO 
WASHINGTON FED INC 
WASHINGTON MUTUAL INC 
WASHINGTON SVGS BANK F S B  
WASHINGTON TR BANCORP INC 
WEBSTER FINANCIAL CORP 
WELLS FARGO & CO 
WESBANCO INC 
WEST COAST BANCORP/OR 
WESTAMERICA BANCORPORATION 
WESTBANK CORP 
WESTCORP
WESTERN SIERRA BANCORP 
WESTFIELD FINANCIAL INC 
WHITNEY HOLDING CORP 
WILLOW GROVE BANCORP INC 
WILMINGTON TRUST CORP 
WILSHIRE BANCORP INC 
WINTRUST FINANCIAL CORP 
WORONOCO BANCORP INC 
WSFS FINANCIAL CORP 
YADKIN VALLEY BANK AND TRUST 
YARDVILLE NATIONAL BANCORP 
ZIONS BANCORPORATION
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